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INTRODUCTION
In 1988, while discussing the biodiversity' crisis, the eminent
Harvard biologist, Edward 0. Wilson stated that "how the human
species will treat life on Earth, so as to shape this greatest of
legacies, good or bad, for all time to come, will be settled during the
next ten years."2 It is now more than ten years later and, while it is
difficult to determine with certainty the tenor of our legacy, it seems
clear that biodiversity conservation3 will be one of the most
compelling environmental problems of the new millennium.4
Scientists estimate that current rates of species loss are
extraordinarily high, perhaps as much as 1000 to 10,000 times
greater than natural extinction rates.'
Although hunting and
1. Biodiversity is the genetic, species, and ecological diversity of
plants, animals, and microorganisms. CONSERVING THE WORLD'S
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 17 (Jeffrey A. McNeely et al. eds., 1990)
[hereinafterWORLD'S BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY]; see infra notes 2126 and accompanying text (defining biodiversity).
2. WORLD'S BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 1, at 22.
3. Biodiversity conservation involves maintaining and restoring
genetic, species, and ecosystem diversity, primarily by controlling
activities that degrade or destroy habitat and ecosystems. See infra
notes 33-38 (discussing biodiversity conservation).
4. See EDwARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 278-80
(1992); A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of
Biodiversity: What Is Its Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 555-57
(1993); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1997).
5. Edward 0. Wilson, The Current State of Biodiversity, in
BIODIVERSITY 12-13 (Edward 0. Wilson & Frances M. Peter eds.,
1988) [hereinafterBIODIVERSITY] (estimating extinction rates due to
destruction of rainforests). This value is an estimate at best. The
difficulty of determining the rate of extinction is compounded by the
fact that there are probably many species that man has not yet
discovered. There are presently about 1.4 million known species on
earth. Scientists estimate that the actual number of species is
probably between 5 and 100 million. WoRLD'S BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY, supra note 1, at 18. One of the tools scientists use to
estimate species numbers and rates of extinction is the theory of

island biogeography, which establishes a direct correlation between
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poaching are also contributing factors, the principal culprit is human
activity that degrades and destroys habitat.6 Many scientists agree
that conserving ecosystems and ecosystem functions is the key to
maintaining overall biological diversity.' Increasingly, scientists,
academicians, and regulators are focusing on developing policy and
law to stem the loss of habitat and protect biodiversity 8 A
fundamental question concerns how to implement biodiversity
conservation through the legal system.
Ecosystem management is emerging as a dominant paradigm for
natural resources management and biodiversity conservation,
involving a balancing of social, economic, and environmental
factors.9 Ecosystem management is generally recognized as a
solution to the failures of existing regulatory programs to halt the

habitat size and biodiversity. On the basis of this relationship,
scientists predict that as the amount and size of viable habitat
decrease, so does biodiversity. BIODIVERS1TY, supra, at 10-13.
6. BIODIVERSITY, supra note 5, at 21; WILLIAM P. CUNNINGHAM
& BARBARA W. SAIGO, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE: A GLOBAL
CONCERN 276-78 (4th ed. 1997). Ecological integrity is a central
tenet of the multidisciplinary science of conservation biology. See
G. TYLER MILLER, JR., LIVING IN THE ENVIRONMENT 634-36 (10th
ed. 1998).
7. See, e.g., BIODIVERSITY, supra note 5, at 410-11.
8. See, e.g., BIODIVERSrrY AND THE LAW (William J. Snape III
ed., 1996); Tarlock, supra note 4; Robert B. Keiter, Conservation
Biology and the Law: Assessing the Challenges Ahead, 69 CHI.KENT L. REV. 911 (1994); Karkkainen, supra note 4; BIODIVERSrrY,
supra note 5.
9. See generally STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON NATURAL RES.,
103D CONG., 2D SESS., ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: SUSTAINING THE

NATION'S NATURAL RESOURCES TRUST (Comm. Print 1994); U.S.
MANAGEMENT:
ECOSYSTEM
OFFICE,
ACCOUNTING
GEN.
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADEQUATELY TEST A PROMISING
[hereinafter GAO
(1994) (GAO/RCED-94-111)
APPROACH
REPORT]; Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line:

Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L.
REV. 294 (1994); R. Edward Grumbine, What is Ecosystem
Management, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1, 27 (1994).
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expanding biodiversity crisis.'0 While ecosystem management has
yet to be universally accepted, there is a growing consensus among
scientists and land management agencies that the approach may be a
good tool to achieve sustainable use of natural resources and
conserve biodiversity."
Public land managers are embracing ecosystem management, in
the Pacific Northwest forests.' 2 Yet, ecosystem management of
public lands may not provide enough habitat to support the
continued existence of many species because ecosystems often
extend beyond public land boundaries to neighboring private lands,
or may be located entirely on private lands. For example, the
endangered Florida Panther is confined to the few remaining wild
areas of south Florida and is in imminent danger of extinction. 3 The
10. Grumbine, supra note 9, at 28. Summarizing the then
existing literature, Grumbine set forth the following definition:
"ecosystem management integrates scientific knowledge of
ecological relationships within a complex sociopolitical and values
framework toward the general goal of protecting native ecosystem
integrity over the long term." Id. at 31.
11. See generally Grumbine, supra note 9; FOREST ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT TEAM, AN ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC,

SocIAL ASSESSMENT (1993) [hereinafter FEMAT] (developing
an ecosystem management program for National Forests and Bureau
of Land Management lands in the Pacific Northwest); GAO REPORT,
supra note 9.
12. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th
Cir. 1996) (affirming a federal district court decision that the use of
ecosystem management for Forest Service and Bureau of Land
Management lands in the Pacific Northwest is consistent with the
National Environmental Policy Act, the National Forest
Management Act, and the Endangered Species Act); FEMAT, supra
note 11; Michael C. Blumm, The Amphibious Salmon: The Evolution
of Ecosystem Management in the Columbia River Basin, 24
ECOLOGY L.Q. 653, 668-74 (1997) (discussing the President's
Northwest Forest Plan and proposed Interior Columbia Basin
Ecosystem Management Project).
13. James R. Snyder et al., South Florida Rockland, in
ECOSYSTEMS OF FLORIDA 269 (Ronald L. Myers & John J. Ewel
eds., 1990); Joseph M. Schaefer, St. Johns River Water Management
District,Wildlife Resources of the Econlockhatchee River Basin, in I
AND
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primary reason is lack of suitable habitat. The habitat needs of the
Florida Panther far exceed the boundaries of public lands in South
Florida. Therefore, additional habitat on private lands will be
required if the panther is to be saved from extinction. This example
illustrates the need to augment habitats on public lands with habitats
on private lands.
In the western United States, where about half of the land area is in
public ownership,' 4 the new emphasis on ecosystem management
may have a significant effect on conservation of natural resources
and biodiversity. However, the situation in the East is more acute,
where the majority of natural lands are in private ownership. 5 The
conclusion that public lands do not provide sufficient habitat for
certain species raises several questions regarding management of
private lands. Do existing regulatory programs provide authority for
ecosystem management and biodiversity conservation? Can federal,
state, or local governments require ecosystem protection and
biodiversity conservation on private lands?
Whether ecosystem management on private lands can be
accomplished through existing statutory authority, regulatory
programs, and institutional arrangements is an open question. While
there are impediments to accomplishing ecosystem management on
public lands, including institutional barriers and insufficient
scientific information, the task is inherently more difficult from a
legal standpoint on private lands because of limited agency authority
and private property rights. Unlike government regulation of public
lands, regulation of private lands must comply with the
ECONLOCKHATCHEE
DEVELOPMENT AND

RESOURCES
NATURAL
BASIN
RIVER
The
PROTECTION PLAN 3-11 (1990).

endangered Florida Panther used to inhabit much of the southeastern
United States. Today, the 20 to 30 remaining panthers have been
driven into remnant wild areas in the southern tip of Florida.
Memorandum from Richard Hamann, Acting Director, Center for
Governmental Responsibility, to the Florida Defenders of the
Environment, Bulletin 23 (Jan. 1998) (on file with the Center for
Governmental Responsibility, University of Florida College of Law,
Gainesville, Florida). Ninety-three percent of five male Florida
Panthers examined had abnormal sperm. Schaefer, supra.
14. George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glickman, 1 PUBLIC
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW, 1-3 (1995).

15. See GAO

REPORT,

supra note 9, at 15.
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constitutional prohibition against uncompensated expropriations of
private property. 6
In 1993, Florida became the first state in the nation to legislatively
endorse ecosystem management as its guiding principle for natural
resources management on public and private lands. 7 The Florida
Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP"), has declared that
biodiversity conservation is an important component of its
ecosystem management strategy.' 8 In addition, Florida has several
other regulatory programs that regulate biodiversity, including a
statewide comprehensive growth management law 9 and innovative
regional programs.2"
16. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution
requires that the government provide "just compensation" if it takes
private property for public use.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

A

government regulation that deprives a property owner of the use and
value of their property may constitute a compensable Fifth
Amendment taking if the regulation "goes to far." Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-18 (1922); see infra notes 118-22 and
accompanying text (discussing regulatory takings as a potential
barrier to regulations to implement ecosystem management and
conserve biodiversity).
17. The Florida Environmental Reorganization Act of 1993, 1993
Fla. Laws ch. 213 § 2(2)(c) (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 20.255
(1997)). The Florida Legislature directed the state's environmental
agency (Department of Environmental Protection) to "protect the
functions of entire ecological systems through enhanced
coordination of public acquisition, regulatory, and planning
Id.; see infra notes 179-98 (discussing Florida's
programs."
ecosystem management policy in greater detail); see also John J.
Fumero, Environmental Law: 1994 Survey of Florida Law-At a
Crossroads in Natural Resource Protection and Management in
Florida, 19 NOVAL. REV. 77, 116 (1994).
18. FLA. DEP'T OF ENvTL. PROT., Beginning Ecosystem
Management, in 4 ENVTL. EXCH. POINT 2, 5-6 1994.
19. See infra notes 131-178 (described Florida's mandatory local
government discussing Florida's growth management program). See
generally FLA. STAT. ch. 163, pt. II (1997). One commentator has
comprehensive planning program as "our nation's most ambitious
experiment in growth management." Thomas G. Pelham, Adequate
Public Facilities Requirements: Reflections on Florida's
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This article examines Florida's regulatory programs to evaluate the
effectiveness and limits of regulatory programs to implement
ecosystem management and conserve biodiversity. Part II defines
and provides background on biodiversity conservation and
ecosystem management. Part III identifies common obstacles to
achieving biodiversity conservation through ecosystem management
and other mechanisms. Part IV analyzes Florida's effectiveness in
implementing ecosystem management and conserving biodiversity.
Part V concludes that most existing programs are unlikely to
conserve biodiversity on private lands, and suggests reforms to
provide for effective ecosystem management and biodiversity
conservation.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Biodiversity
Biodiversity is the variety of animals, plants, and microorganisms,
and the ecosystems and ecological processes of which they are a part
that occur in nature.2' Biodiversity occurs on three levels. Genetic
diversity refers to variations of the same genes within an individual
species. 2 Species diversity describes the number of different kinds
of species."
Ecosystem diversity describes the richness and
complexity of a biological community, including the number of
trophic levels and niches.24
Many humans recognize that
biodiversity is valuable because it provides important ecosystem

Concurrency System for Managing Growth, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
973,974 (1992).
20. See infra Part IV.D (discussing Florida's regulatory programs
for the Green Swamp ecosystem and the Wekiva, Econlockhatchee,
and Tomoka Rivers).
21. WORLD's BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 1, at 17.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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services to the environment,25 as well as food, and medicine to
humans.26
There is general agreement in the scientific community that the
world is experiencing a biodiversity crisis, 7 due in large part to the
unprecedented destruction of nature caused by the exploding human
population. 8 Human development activities destroy habitat directly
or diminish its value through pollution, fragmentation, and edge
effects. 9 Habitat is also diminished by exotic species introduced by
humans,3 0 which degrade habitat by competing with native species,
or directly killing native species. Hunting and poaching have also
contributed to loss of biodiversity. In addition, predator and pest
Finally, some species are
control diminishes biodiversity. I
32
threatened by genetic assimilation.
Biodiversity conservation involves conserving genetic, species,
and ecosystem diversity. Many scientists believe that the key to
maintaining overall diversity is to focus on maintaining ecological
25. See generally BIODIVERS1TY AND ECOSYSTEM FUNCTION
(Emst-Detlef Schulze & Harold A. Mooney eds., 1993).
26. CUNNINGHAM & SAIGO, supra note 6, at 272-75.
"Biodiversity is also a source of economic activity and wealth." Id.
"The United States Fish and Wildlife Service estimates that
Americans spend $18 billion every year watching wildlife." Id. at
274. In addition, many people value wildlife simply because it
exists. Id. at 274-75.
27. See, e.g., BIODIVERSITY, supra note 5; LANDSCAPE LINKAGES
AND BIODIVERSITY (Wendy E. Hudson ed., 1991); WILSON, supra
note 4, at 278-80; BIODIVERS1TY AND ECOSYSTEM FUNCTION, supra
note 25.
28. BIODIVERSITY, supra note 5, at 21.
29. CUNNINGHAM & SAIGO, supra note 6, at 86, 276, 282.
30. Id. at 281-82.
31. Id. at 270-81. Pest control may be intentional, as in the
poisoning of coyotes in the American West, or unintentional, as in
the spraying of endangered schaus swallowtail butterflies in the
Florida Keys with pesticides intended to control mosquitos. Thomas
C. Emmel, Overview: Mosquito Control, Pesticides, and the
Ecosystem, in MOSQUITO CONTROL PESTICIDES: ECOLOGICAL
IMPACTS AND MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES 12-13 (Thomas C.
Emmel & John C. Tucker eds., 1991).
32. CUNNINGHAM & SAIGO, supra note 6, at 283.
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diversity.33 In practical terms, biodiversity conservation requires
protecting the integrity of natural areas to prevent species and
ecosystem losses. Ultimately, this involves limiting or prohibiting
activities that degrade or destroy ecosystem functions, such as
removal of vegetation or disruption of surface water flows.
Government actions to conserve biodiversity may take different
forms, many of which restrict the use of private land. For example,
the government may adopt laws that restrict development in certain
types of habitat, such as wetlands protection programs and riparian
buffer zones. Government may also limit the density and intensity
of development through zoning regulations, restrict removal of
natural vegetation, and designate and restrict activities in wildlife
corridors.34 Government may also develop incentives, such as lower
tax rates, to encourage private property owners to conserve natural
systems and thus conserve biodiversity. Land acquisition and
management of natural areas provides government with the greatest
control of land use, but is expensive. 5
Precisely how much, and to what degree, land and water must be
protected to conserve biodiversity are scientific questions that vary
by ecosystem and depend upon the nature and intensity; of the
33. See, e.g., BIODIVERSiTY, supra note 5, at 410-11.
34. Corridors provide wildlife "highways" by which animals can
Brian L. Kuehl,
roam from one habitat area to another.
Conservation Obligations Under the Endangered Species Act: A
Case Study of the Yellowstone Grizzly Bear, 64 U. COLO. L. REv.
607, 618 (1993). Corridors are important to animals with large
home ranges, because corridors can greatly increase the availability
of suitable habitat for these species. See Joseph M. Schaefer & Mark
T. Brown, Designing and Protecting River Corridorsfor Wildlife, in
3 RIVERS 1, 18 (1992) (discussing the concept of wildlife home
ranges). Corridors themselves may also provide useful habitat to
various species. Corridors may satisfy all the habitat needs of some
species with small home ranges and also provide habitat functions to
large species as they move from one intact area to another. Id.
35. Conservation easements are a less costly alternative to
acquiring full title that have protected millions of acres of privately
owned land in the United States. Anita P. Miller, Report of the
Subcommittee on Innovative Growth Management Measures:
Preservationof Agricultural Land and Open Space, 23 URB. LAW.
821, 824 (1991).
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The difficulty of conserving biodiversity is
development.36
compounded by scientist's limited data and understanding of
ecological interrelationships and ecosystems.37 For example, there is
substantial scientific uncertainty concerning the number of species in
the world, the rate of biodiversity loss, the methodology to define
species, the minimum habitat to maintain or restore viable
populations of species, the minimum number of individuals to
maintain or restore viable populations of species, and the effect of
human activities on species and ecosystem viability.3" It is also
unclear in many instances how degradation of habitat and
ecosystems affects wildlife. These uncertainties present regulators
with the difficult task of deciding whether to adopt land use
restrictions based on imperfect understandings of ecosystem
functions and relationships.
Florida is experiencing a biodiversity crisis like the rest of the
world. Florida's ecosystems support a rich diversity of plants and
animals, many of which are unique to the state. Remarkably, the
state supports some 235 species of vascular plants that are found
nowhere else in the world.39 Further, about 17 percent of America's
vertebrate species are now found only in Florida.4" Yet, despite its
unique and abundant biodiversity, the state's ecosystems are on the
brink of collapse, due to decades of unsustainable agricultural,
residential, and commercial development. 4
Florida's burgeoning population and development have severely
stressed the state's natural resources, including water, wildlife, and
habitat.4z For example, during the past 50 years human activities
have destroyed about 90 percent of Florida's old-growth longleaf

36.
37.
38.
90.
39.

WORLD'S BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 1, at 21.
See BIODIVERSrrY, supra note 5, at 14.
See generally CUNNINGHAM & SAIGO, supra note 6, at 270FLA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT.,

2 ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT

COMMITTEE REPORTS 16 (1994) [hereinafterCOMMrITEE REPORTS].

40. Id.
41. JAMES COX ET AL., FLORIDA GAME AND FRESH WATER FISH
COMMISSION, CLOSING THE GAPS IN FLORIDA'S WILDLIFE HABITAT
CONSERVATION SYSTEM 4-5 (1994).

42. The population of Florida is currently approaching 14 million,
and is projected to exceed 22 million by the year 2020. Id. at 16, 79.
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pine forests, which historically covered more than half of the state. 3
The state has also lost over 50 percent of its wetlands." As a result,
Florida has more federally listed species than any other state in the
nation except California.45
In Florida, much of the remaining habitat is on privately owned
lands. Accordingly, if ecological collapse is to be avoided, it is
essential that Florida achieve greater control over activities on
private lands. While Florida has several aggressive land acquisition
programs,46 it is unlikely that the state can buy and manage enough
natural areas to maintain and restore biodiversity because of the high
cost of land and close proximity of natural areas to populated areas
43. COMMITTEE REPORTS, supra note 39, at 17; Ronald L. Myers
& John J. Ewel, Problems, Prospects, and Strategies for
Conservation, in ECOSYSTEMS OF FLORIDA 622 (Ronald L. Myers &
Jack J. Ewel eds., 1990).
44. COMMITTEE REPORTS, supra note 39, at 17.
45. Joe M. Schaefer, An Overview of Florida'sEndangered and
Threatened Species and Their Habitats, Lecture Before the Florida
Bar Continuing Legal Education Committee (Feb. 8, 1991), in
WILDLIFE, HABITAT AND LAND USE LAW: FLORIDA'S DEVELOPING

Zoo, Feb. 8-9, 1991, at 1.3.
46. Florida has several state land acquisition programs, including
the Conservation and Recreational Lands program ("CARL"), the
Florida Communities Trust program, the Florida Recreational Trails
program, the Ecosystem Management and Restoration Trust Fund,
and inholdings and additions programs of the Division of Recreation
and Parks, the Florida Game and Fresh Water Game Commission,
and the Division of Forestry. See FLA. STAT. chs. 259.032 (1997),
380.510, 260.016, 373.459 (2001). Funding for the various land
acquisition programs is supplied by several funds, including
Preservation 2000, a state bonding program intended to raise $300
million annually over the next ten years to supply partial funding for
all of the land acquisition programs, and the Water Management
Lands Trust Fund (Save Our Rivers), which supports acquisitions
relating to water resources. See also id. at chs. 375.045, 373.59
(2001); THE GREEN SWAMP TASK FORCE, THE GREEN SWAMP
SYSTEM: A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS 3-27 (1992) (report prepared by
the Green Swamp Task Force and the Green Swamp Technical
Advisory Committee for the Polk County Board of County
Commissioners, Polk County, Florida).
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which are subject to intense development pressure. In response to
the state's impending biodiversity crisis, the Florida Legislature
recently directed the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection to "protect the functions of entire ecological systems
through enhanced coordination of public acquisition, regulatory, and
planning programs."47 DEP has endorsed ecosystem management as
the best approach to satisfy this new legislative directive.48 Part
IV.B of this article discusses Florida's ecosystem management
program in detail.
B. Ecosystem Management
Ecosystem management has emerged as the consensus paradigm to
manage and conserve natural systems, and thus to conserve
biodiversity. In 1994, in an article summarizing the existing
literature, Edward Grumbine defined ecosystem management as
"integrat[ing] scientific knowledge of ecological relationships within
a complex sociopolitical and values framework toward the general9
4
goal of protecting native ecosystem integrity over the long term.
Grumbine identified ten dominate themes: 1) manage entire ecologic
systems, not individual levels of systems (genes, species,
populations, ecosystems, landscapes); 2) manage based on
ecological boundaries, not political boundaries; 3) protect total
native diversity (species, populations, ecosystems) and ecological
patterns and processes that maintain that diversity; 4) conduct
research and collect data and use that information to improve
management; 5) monitor management results; 6) adapt management
to reflect new information and address uncertainty; 7) promote
interagency cooperation between federal, state, and local agencies as
well as private parties; 8) change the structure and operation of land
management agencies; 9) recognize that humans influence and are
affected by ecological patterns and processes; and 10) recognize that

47. The Florida Environmental Reorganization Act of 1993, 1993
Fla. Laws ch. 213 § 2(2)(c) (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 20.255
(1997)).
48. See infra notes 179-98 and accompanying text (discussing
Florida's ecosystem management program in greater detail); see also
FLA. DEP'TOFENVTL. PROT., supra note 18, at 5, 6.
49. Grumbine, supra note 9, at 31.
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human values play a dominate role in ecosystem management
goals."
Despite the efforts of Grumbine and others, "ecosystem
management" continues to mean many things to many people. Most
definitions of ecosystem management are vague and devoid of
operational meaning. Generally, ecosystem management attempts to
integrate scientific, social, and economic considerations, and as such
is laden with value choices. Ecosystem management programs that
do not recognize and address these conflicting value choices will
probably be ineffective.5
Regardless of any definitional uncertainties it is clear that
biodiversity conservation is a fundamental goal of ecosystem
management. Biodiversity conservation is clearly identified by
Grumbine and other commentators as an essential component of
ecosystem management. 2
The federal government has begun
implementing ecosystem management, primarily targeting public
lands. 3 Government agencies implementing ecosystem management
have re-articulated that biodiversity conservation is a fundamental
goal. For example, the Forest Service and Bureau of Land
Management ecosystem management programs for the Pacific
Northwest purport to conserve biodiversity,54 as does Florida.5
What most ecosystem management definitions fail to address is
how the approach will accomplish biodiversity conservation on
private lands. Specifically, what government actions are necessary
to conserve biodiversity. As this article discussed in the preceding
Part, biodiversity conservation will require restriction of private land
use.5" Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management57 ecosystem

50. Id. at 29-31.
51. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 38-39.
52. See Grumbine, supra note 9, at 30-3 1; Blumm, supra note 12,
at 659.
53. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 9; FEMAT, supra
note 11; STEVEN L. YAFFEE ET AL., ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT EXPERIENCE

(1996) (providing a comprehensive inventory of ecosystem
management projects in the United States).
54. FEMAT, supra note 11.
55. FLA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 18, at 4.
56. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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management programs for public lands reveal the types of actions
that are necessary to conserve biodiversity. These programs
dramatically restrict harvest of timber from riparian areas and late
successional forests to benefit fish and wildlife."
Ecosystem management has begun to attract attention at the state
level. 9 In 1993, Florida became the first state to adopt ecosystem
management as an official state policy.6" However, it is unclear
whether Florida agencies and local governments have the authority
and will to successfully conserve biodiversity through ecosystem
management of private lands. Part IV.B of this article examines
Florida's ecosystem management approach in detail.

III. COMMON INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BARRIERS TO
BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT

There are substantial institutional and legal barriers to achieving
biodiversity conservation and ecosystem management. Key barriers
involve inadequate geographic and substantive jurisdiction, limited
time frame, intergovernmental coordination, scientific uncertainty,
inadequate control of land use, and private property rights. 1 These
57. See generally U.S. Bureau of Land Management, at
http://www.blm.gov/nhp/index.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002).
58. Id.
59. See YAFFEE ET AL., supra note 53.
60. The Florida Legislature directed the state's environmental
protection and land management agency to "protect the functions of
entire ecological systems through enhanced coordination of public
acquisition, regulatory, and planning programs." See The Florida
Environmental Reorganization Act of 1993, 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 213
§ 2(2)(c) (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 20.255 (1997)). The agency
has adopted ecosystem management as the guiding principle for
achieving this objective. FLA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note

18, at 1.
61. Commentators have documented many of these barriers to
ecosystem management. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 9
(identifying insufficient scientific and socioeconomic data,
coordination among federal agencies, collaboration and consensusbuilding between federal and nonfederal parties as barriers to
ecosystem management); Alyson C. Flournoy, Beyond the Balance
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barriers must be overcome if ecosystem management or some other
management strategy is going to conserve biodiversity. Part IV of
this article analyzes Florida's experience in dealing with these
barriers.
A. Political Versus Ecological Boundaries
The geographic jurisdiction of government entities is often based
upon political factors rather than upon the physical extent of natural
systems. 2 Thus, natural systems often extend outside of political
jurisdictions. 3 For example, rivers may extend through several
counties or states. A county has jurisdiction over the portion of the
river running through its boundaries, but has no jurisdiction over
portions of the river that fall outside its boundaries.
Inconsistent and uncoordinated regulation of natural systems may
have far reaching adverse effects because of the systems'
interconnected nature. For example, rivers with intact riparian
habitat often serve as important wildlife corridors for wildlife. If one
local government allows substantial fragmentation of riparian
habitat, the integrity of the river system as a wildlife corridor could
be degraded in adjacent counties. Similarly, a local government that
allows substantial clearing of riparian vegetation may increase
pollution from stormwater runoff, thereby polluting not only the
river adjacent to that local government's jurisdiction, but also

of Nature: Environmental Law Faces the New Ecology: Preserving
Dynamic Systems; Wetlands, Ecology and Law, 7 DuKE ENvTL. L.
& POL'Y F. 105 (1996) (identifying delineation methodologies,
jurisdiction, case-by-case permitting without planning, and reliance
on compensatory mitigation as working at cross-purposes with
nature); Thomas T. Ankersen & Richard Hamann, Ecosystem
Management and the Everglades:A Legal and InstitutionalAnalysis,
11 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 473 (1996) (identifying geographic
boundaries, institutional boundaries, procedural boundaries, and
scientific uncertainty as barriers to ecosystem management).
62. A notable exception involves Florida's Water Management
Districts, whose jurisdiction is based on the hydrologic boundaries of
the state's five major watersheds, rather than on political factors. See
FLA. STAT. ch. 373.069 (1997).
63. Kuehl, supra note 34, at 615.
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downstream portions of the river located within other local
governments.
B. IntergovernmentalCoordination
Rare is the government agency that has sufficient statutory
authority to regulate and protect all important environmental
parameters of a natural system. It is a fundamental axiom of federal
and state administrative law that agencies are creatures of statute and
have no legitimate authority beyond that authorized by law. 4 State
or federal government could create new regulatory agencies with
broad powers, but are unlikely to do so because of current trends to
downsize and streamline environmental regulatory programs. 5 In
contrast, local governments possess broad powers to make law for
the "health, safety, and general welfare" of the citizenry. 6 Despite
this broad authority, most local governments have neither the
resources nor the political will to provide comprehensive protection
for natural systems. Even if they had the resources and were willing
to protect important natural resource values of river watersheds, their
physical jurisdiction is often limited to less than the full extent of a
natural system. Thus, many systems are subject to the regulatory
authority of multiple government entities. In order to achieve
ecosystem management and conserve biodiversity, regulatory
entities must cooperate in all stages of planning and regulation.
Intergovernmental coordination can be promoted through several
mechanisms.
Intergovernmental agreements between the
appropriate agencies and governments can facilitate coordination.
Agreements may be interagency, interlocal, or some combination of
both. Intergovernmental agreements are useful, but may not be
64. See, e.g., California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465, 501 (E.D.
1980) (stating that "[a]dministrative agencies are products of the
law-they have no legitimate powers save that given to them by law.
When they fail to comply with the law, they simply act ultra viresbeyond their power. When an agency acts beyond the power given it
by Congress, then the courts must perform their duty which is to
require the agency to comply with the law").
65. See, e.g., Florida Environmental Reorganization Act ch. 213,
2(2)(c); see also Fumero, supra note 17 (discussing The Florida
Environmental Reorganization Act of 1993).
66. Tarlock, supra note 4, at 575-76.
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legally binding.67 Another approach is to mandate that local
governments cooperate.
Florida's planning law requires local
governments to practice intergovernmental coordination,68 with
limited success to date.69
C. InadequateLaw ProtectingBiodiversity
Environmental laws provide little or no protection for many
species located on privately owned lands. The shortcomings of the
nation's primary wildlife law, the Endangered Species Act
("ESA"),11 are well documented. 7 Although the ESA can promote
conservation of habitat of species listed by the Fish and Wildlife
Service ("FWS") as threatened or endangered, the Act in no way
creates a comprehensive regulatory program for natural systems
because it does not apply to the vast majority of flora and fauna or

67. See, e.g., Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin
Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104, 111 Stat. 2219 (1997) (providing for
termination of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin
Compact between Alabama, Florida, and Georgia if those states fail
to agree on an equitable apportionment of surface waters by
December 31, 1998).
68. FLA. STAT. ch. 163.3177(6)(h) (1997).
69. See infra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing
shortcomings of intergovernmental coordination in Florida).
70. The ESA establishes a national program to identify and
conserve endangered and threatened species. 16 U.S.C. §§ 15311544 (1988). The general purpose of the ESA includes conservation
of endangered and threatened species and the ecosystems upon
which they depend. Id. § 153 1(b).
71. See generally Daniel J. Rohlf, There's Something Fishy Going
On Here: A Critique of the National Marine Fisheries Service's
Definition of Species Under the EndangeredSpecies Act, 24 ENVTL.
L. 617, 619 (1994) (discussing the absence of substantive protection
in the ESA for non-listed species); Oliver A. Houck, The
Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S.
Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 277
(1993); Christopher A. Cole, Note, Species Conservation in the
United States: The Ultimate Failure of the Endangered Species Act
and Other Land Use Laws, 72 B.U. L. REV. 343 (1992).

20

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL

[VOL. XIII

their habitat.72 The Act applies only to species formally listed by the
FWS as threatened or endangered.
If a species is listed, the Act may protect that species through
agency consultation73 or the takings prohibition,74 but only

72. The ESA directs the Secretary of the Interior to list species
threatened or endangered with extinction. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)-(c)
(1988). The Act's protection applies only to species listed by these
agencies. See Keiter, supra note 9, at 307-09; see also Cole, supra
note 71, at 346.
73. Section 7 of the Act, requires that federal agencies abide by
the Act's prohibitions and carry out programs for the conservation of
listed species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1). Under Section 7, federal
agencies must also consult with the Secretary of the Interior to
ensure their actions do not jeopardize the continued existence of
threatened or endangered species, nor result in destruction or
modification of the habitats of such species. Id. § 1536(a)(2). After
initiating consultation, an agency or permit applicant may not make
any "irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources ...which
has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation of
any reasonable and prudent alternative measures." Id. § 1536(d).
74. Section 9 of the ESA prohibits any person from taking listed
species. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B). The Section 9 prohibition against
taking listed species has potential broad application to activities that
actually kill endangered species. Congress defined the term "take"
to include "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." Id.
§ 1532(19). Under the current FWS definition of "harm," habitat
modification that actually kills or injures wildlife, i.e., construction
activities that remove trees, which provide critical habitat for a listed
species, such as red cockaded woodpeckers, could amount to a
"taking" of a listed species. The FWS defines "harm" to "include
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1997).
In Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources, 852
F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit held that state failure to
control feral goats which were destroying habitat-of the listed Palila
bird constituted a taking under the FWS definition. The FWS
regulation was reviewed and held valid by the Supreme Court in
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occasionally provides incidental protection to non-listed species.
The Act's effectiveness in conserving biodiversity is diminished
further by backlogs in listing species," designating critical habitat,76
and developing and implementing recovery plans.7 7
State endangered species laws mirror the ESA and suffer many of
its shortcomings. For example, The Florida Endangered Species Act
("FESA")7 8 complements many of the provisions of the federal
Endangered Species Act.79 Notably, the FESA prohibits takings of
listed species, including plants as well as animals. 0 However, like

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapterof Communitiesfor a Great Oregon,
515 U.S. 687 (1995).
75. Houck, supra note 71, at 281.
76. Id. at 297. The ESA requires the FWS to designate critical
habitat for listed species. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(5), 1533(a)(3), (b)(2)
(1988). Yet as of early 1992, the FWS had designated habitat for
only sixteen percent of listed species (critical habitat had been
designated for only 105 out of 651 species). Houck, supra note 71,
at 302.
77. Houck, supra note 71, at 345. The ESA directs the FWS to
develop recovery plans for listed species, "unless he finds that such a
plan will not promote the conservation of the species." 16 U.S.C. §
1533(f)(1). The Secretary, when developing and implementing
recovery plans, must give priority to endangered or threatened
species which are most likely to benefit from a recovery plan, and
which are threatened by construction, other development projects, or
other forms of economic activity. Id. § 1533(f)(1)(A). Recovery
plans must include: 1) site-specific management actions which are
necessary to ensure the conservation and survival of the species; 2)
objective, measurable criteria to measure the success of the plan; and
3) estimates of the time and cost to achieve the plan's goal. Id. §
1533(f)(B).
78. FLA. STAT. ch. 372.072 (1997).
79. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988). Section 1538 of the federal
act and section 372.0725 make it unlawful for any person to kill or
wound an endangered species. Id. § 1538; FLA. STAT. ch. 372.0725.
80. FLA. STAT. ch. 372.0725; see also FLA. STAT. ch. 581.185(3)
(making it unlawful for any person to willfully destroy or harvest an
endangered plant without permission from the landowner and the
state).
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the federal ESA, the Florida statute applies only to listed species."1
FESA provides little benefit to non-listed species, other than when
habitat preserved for a listed species happens to coincide with the
habitat needs of non-listed species. Further, the state's prohibition
on destroying or removing listed plants is undercut by substantial
exemptions, including clearing or disturbing land for agriculture or
silviculture, building sites, and roads.82 Like the ESA, the Florida
statute is largely reactive in nature, coming into play only after a
species has declined to such an extent that it has been listed through
an administrative process as threatened or endangered. The statute
does not provide for protection of habitat of species that are in
decline but have not yet been listed, such as the central Florida
crowned snake and short-tailed hawk.83
Other laws, such as wetlands protection laws, may consider
impacts to wildlife and wildlife habitat, but jurisdiction under these
laws is limited to wetlands, and thus provides little protection for
other types of natural systems. For example, when reviewing dredge
and fill permit applications under Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") applies guidelines
which prohibit discharges that cause significant degradation of
waters of the United States. 4 Activities contributing to significant
degradation include activities that cause significant adverse effects to
water quality, fish, plankton, aquatic life, aquatic ecosystem
diversity and stability, and other wildlife dependent on aquatic
ecosystems." The Corps permit review criteria consider a variety of
aquatic ecosystem functions,86 yet jurisdiction is limited to aquatic

81. See generally Rohlf, supra note 71, at 619 (discussing the
absence of substantive protection in the ESA for non-listed species).
82. FLA. STAT. ch. 581.185(8).
83. See Schaefer, supra note 13, at 3-32.
84. The Corps applies guidelines commonly referred to as the
"404(b)(1) guidelines," which are adopted by EPA in consultation
with the Corps. 40 C.F.R. § 230 (1997).
85. Id. § 230.10(c).
86. The Corps must also consider secondary and cumulative
impacts of dredge and fill activities on the aquatic ecosystem and
evaluate whether there are practicable alternatives that would be less
damaging than the proposed discharge. Id. § 230.10(a)-(h). The
Corps must deny the permit if practicable alternatives are available.
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and wetland systems, and does not extend to non-aquatic areas or
functions.
State water pollution and wetland programs share similar
limitations. For example, the Florida Air and Water Pollution
Control Act directs DEP to regulate point source discharges into
waters of the state.87 The Act contains broad language directing DEP
to conserve wildlife, fish, and other aquatic or plant life, including
listed species and certain aquatic and wetland dependent species.88
However, the Act does not provide DEP with authority to consider
impacts of discharges on upland species of plants and animals unless
those species are listed as threatened or endangered. Further, the Act
does not apply to a host of other activities that may harm
biodiversity, such as destruction and removal of upland vegetation.
Thus, the Act does not adequately protect biodiversity because it
fails to consider the impact on the vast array of other plants and
animals that are integral to Florida's biodiversity. Another example
involves Florida's water management districts,89 whose statutory
authority to regulate "water resources"90 includes consideration of
affects of land development activities and other non-point sources on
aquatic and wetland dependent species, but does not extend to
uplands.9

Id. § 230.12(a)(3)(i). Practicable alternatives are presumed to be
available if the activity is not water dependent. Id. § 230. 10(a)(3).
87. FLA. STAT. ch. 403.088. The legislature defined "waters"
broadly as "rivers, lakes, streams, springs, impoundments, and all
other waters or bodies of water, including fresh, brackish, saline,
tidal, surface, or underground waters." Id. at ch. 403.031(13). The
Act also directs DEP to regulate sources of air pollution. Id. at ch.
403.061.
88. Id. at ch. 403.021 (1997). The program is similar to the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
permitting program authorized by the federal Clean Water Act. See
33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
89. See FLA. STAT. ch. 373.069.
90. Id. at chs. 373.413(1), 373.414(1). The Florida Legislature
did not define "water resources."
91. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Consol.-Tomoka Land
Co., 717 So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), reh'g denied, 727 So.
2d 904 (Fla. 1999); Friends of Fort George, Inc. v. Fairfield Cmtys.,
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D. Scientific Uncertainty
Scientific uncertainty is a familiar issue in environmental law.92
Biodiversity conservation is fraught with scientific uncertainty,
including defining species, determining minimum individuals
required to maintain viable populations, determining minimum
habitat requirements, and selecting an appropriate timeframe to
judge the success of conservation efforts.93 When policymakers and
regulators seeking to conserve biodiversity face incomplete or
equivocal information, how should they respond? Should they go
forward and implement polices to conserve biodiversity based on
imperfect understanding of ecosystem dynamics and functions, or
should they forgo action and wait for more complete information?
In 1990, regulators developing protection zones for Florida's
Econlockhatchee River were faced with this dilemma, having to
evaluate the legitimacy of a riparian habitat protection zone, the
width of which was based on an average value of home ranges of
wildlife that inhabited the area.94 Scientists recommended that
regulators adopt a 550-foot wide buffer zone, which scientists
estimated would maintain viable populations of about 50 percent of
the species living in the Econlockhatchee River Basin.9 5 Opponents
questioned the scientific rational for the zones, arguing that a buffer
zone of a constant width was irrational because it ignored variations
in habitat value at different points along the river.96 Opponents also
argued the scientific rational was flawed because it was largely
based on existing data from scientific literature and not on
Econlockhatchee-specific research. Rather than forgo action and
wait for more definite information, the regulators chose to go
Inc., Nos. 85-3537, 85-3596, 1986 Fla. Div. Adm. Hearings LEXIS
4106 (Oct. 6, 1986).
92. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 4 (discussing the difficulty in
determining the number of species in the world and extinction rates).
93. See generally CUNNINGHAM & SAIGO, supra note 6, at 27090.
94. Schaefer, supra note 13, at 3-42.
95. Id.
96. Opponents attacked the basis of the protection zones during
rule adoption hearings, but the basis was upheld by an administrative
hearing officer as based on logic and reason. Consol.-Tomoka, 717
So. 2d at 75, 76.
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forward and implement the habitat protection zones based on a lessthan-perfect understanding of ecosystem dynamics and functions.97
Policymakers and regulators who choose to wait for conclusive
resource specific research before developing programs to conserve
resources run the risk of allowing continued degradation or
destruction, perhaps irreversible, of the resource. Conversely,
policies based on inadequate or incorrect information may not
protect the resource and may even contribute to its degradation.
Further, policies based on incomplete information may be
susceptible to legal challenges claiming the policies are unreasonable
or unsupported by scientific evidence.98
The precautionary principle, well established in international
environmental law,99 provides some guidance in dealing with
scientific uncertainty. The principle, as articulated in the 1983
World Charter for Nature, warns against allowing projects to
proceed when potential adverse effects are not fully understood."°
Included in the 1992 Rio Declaration, the principle states "lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing

97. See infra pp. 80-88 (discussing the Econlockhatchee River
habitat protection zones).
98. See, e.g., Consol.-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 75-76 (landowners
asserted the St. Johns River Water Management District proposed
riparian habitat protection zone for the Tomoka River was arbitrary
and capricious and unsupported by competent substantial evidence).
99. See G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Agenda Item 21,
at II (l1)(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7 (1983); Report of the U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, Principle 15, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/6 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]; United
Nations Conference on Environment and De-velopment: Convention
on World's Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818
[hereinafter Convention on Biodiversity] (entered into force on
December 29, 1993).
100. The full text of the Principle states: "Activities which are
likely to pose a significant risk to nature shall be preceded by an
exhaustive examination; their proponents shall demonstrate that
expected benefits outweigh potential damage to nature, and where
potential adverse effects are not fully understood, the activities
should not proceed." G.A. Res. 37/7, supra note 99.
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cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."''
The principle was also restated in the Convention on Biological
Diversity. 102

Ecosystem management may be well suited to dealing with the
problem of scientific uncertainty because it includes mechanisms to
respond to the dynamic nature of natural systems and the possibility
that management approaches may need to be changed regularly.
Adaptive management, a central component of ecosystem
management, provides for regular testing and experimentation to
determine the best ways to manage natural systems. 03 New
information should be used to refine and improve management of the
resource. This approach reduces the likelihood that ineffective
policies will remain in effect for long periods of time.
E. Limitations on Agency Regulation
1. Jurisdiction and Authority
Ideally, natural systems should be regulated by government entities
with geographic jurisdiction over entire systems, and with sufficient
substantive authority to protect essential natural functions and
overall ecological integrity. This is a rare situation indeed.
Government entities may have broad substantive authority, as is the
case with local governments, but limited geographic jurisdiction.
Or, conversely, state and federal agencies may possess broad
geographic jurisdiction but limited authority. For example, the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service has geographic jurisdiction over the entire
United States, but its substantive authority, granted by the
101. The full text states: "In order to protect the environment, the
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according
to their capabilities. . Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation." Rio Declaration,supra note 99.
102. Convention on Biodiversity, supra note 99 (stating in the
preamble that "where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss
of World's Biological Diversity, lack of full scientific certainty
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or
minimize such a threat").
103. Grumbine, supra note 9, at 31.
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Endangered Species Act, is limited primarily to protecting species
formally listed as threatened or endangered." 4 Similarly, a state
agency may have jurisdiction over the entire system, but substantive
authority is limited to protecting only a small complement of
relevant environmental parameters. 05
The logical unit of government to regulate many natural systems is
a regional entity with jurisdiction over the entire ecosystem.
However, existing regional governments may have inadequate
statutory authority to adequately protect system resources, and may
have to work in tandem with local governments, whose authority
may be substantially broader.
For example, Florida's water
management districts have regional geographic jurisdiction, but their
authority is limited to regulating "water resources."'0 6 Thus, district
efforts to protect uplands through regulation'07 require close
cooperation with local governments." 8 Florida's regional planning
councils are also regional agencies, but their authority is limited
primarily to developing strategic regional plans to govern land use
and acting in an advisory capacity to local governments.' 9 One
comprehensive approach for regulating natural systems involves the
New Jersey Pinelands, where federal and state legislation required a
regional commission to develop a comprehensive management plan
that local governments must implement."0 The legislation gave the
commission authority to review and overrule local decisions that are
inconsistent with the comprehensive management plan."' This
approach avoids the problems discussed above because it vests

104. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 342-58 and accompanying text (discussing
statutory authority of Florida's water management districts).
106. Id.
107. The water management districts have authority to acquire
uplands but not regulate uplands. See FLA. STAT. ch. 373.139
(1997); see also infra notes 342-58 and accompanying text.
108. See infra Part IV.G.2.a (discussing water management district
and local government protection programs for the Wekiva and
Econlockhatchee Rivers).
109. FLA. STAT. chs. 186.504, 186.505, 186.507.
110. Act of Nov. 10, 1978, Pub. L. 95-625 § 502, 92 Stat. 3467;
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:18A-1-13:18A-29 (West 1979).
111. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:18A-10(c).
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comprehensive authority within a single government entity
possessing jurisdiction over the entire natural resource.
State administrative procedure statutes that unduly restrict agency
discretion create another potential barrier for agencies seeking to
adopt new regulatory programs to implement ecosystem
management and protect biodiversity." 2 For example, recent
amendments to Florida's Administrative Procedure Act require both
a general grant of rulemaking authority and a specific law that grants
"particular powers and duties.""' 3 The statute eschews familiar
"reasonably related" and "arbitrary and capricious" standards, stating
that
[n]o agency shall have authority to adopt a rule only because
it is reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling
legislation and is not arbitrary and capricious ....
I
The Legislature added these provisions in response to concerns of
the regulated community, including developers and property owners,

112. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. chs. 120.52(8), 120.536(1).
113. Id.
114. Id. The following language is repeated twice in the statute:
A grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not
sufficient to allow an agency to adopt a rule; a specific
law to be implemented is also required. An agency may
adopt only rules that implement, interpret, or make
specific the particular powers and duties granted by the
enabling statute. No agency shall have authority to adopt
a rule only because it is reasonably, related to the purpose
of the enabling legislation and is not arbitrary and
capricious, nor shall an agency have the authority to
implement statutory provisions setting forth general
legislative intent or policy. Statutory language granting
rulemaking authority or generally describing the powers
and functions of an agency shall be construed to extend
no further than the particular powers and duties conferred
by the same statute.
Id. This provision was amended again in 1999 to require that the
rule implement or interpret the "specific powers and duties" granted
by the enabling statute. 1999 Fla. Laws chs. 99-379 §§ 2, 3
(codified at FLA. STAT. chs. 120.52(8), 120.536(1) (2001)).
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that state agencies were over-regulating and needed to be
constrained. "5
Florida's Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") language has the
potential to hinder agency development of new regulatory programs
to implement ecosystem management and conserve biodiversity,
because many existing statutes do not include these or related
terms. "6 Thus, if the Florida Legislature wants agencies to
implement ecosystem management and conserve biodiversity, the
Legislature must now adopt new statutes or amend existing statutes
to specifically authorize these activities." 7

115. See Jim Rossi, The 1996 Revised Florida Administrative
Procedure Act: A Survey of Major Provisions Affecting Florida
Agencies, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 283, 286 (1997) (describing a
populist counterrevolution to agency rulemaking led by a regulatory
reform coalition composed of "proponents of flexibility and
rationality in the administrative process; those who support
legislative-political
to
majoritarian-primarily
accountability
processes; and libertarian opponents of any attempt, legislative or
otherwise, to regulate markets-even where regulation may enhance
social welfare").
116. See infra pp. 89-95 and accompanying text (discussing the
Tomoka River cases). But c.f, Consol.-Tomoka Land Co. v. St.
Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 717 So. 2d 72, 75-78 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998), reh'g denied, 727 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1999) (administrative
law judge held that statutory language directing the District to
"require such permits and impose such reasonable conditions" to
assure surface water management systems are not "harmful to the
water resources of the district," and to adopt rules necessary to
implement the provisions of this part which are "consistent with state
water policy and shall not allow harm to water resources.. ." did not
provide sufficient authority for the riparian protection zones to
protect aquatic and wetland dependent wildlife because the statute
did not refer to a riparian habitat protection zone or any specific
program or duty which would authorize the zones).
117. See infra pp. 89-95 and accompanying text (discussing the
Tomoka River cases).
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2. Private Property Rights
Few legal issues are as difficult as determining the boundary
between the rights of private property owners and regulation for the
protection of the public health, safety, and welfare. While it is
beyond the scope of this article to conduct an in-depth analysis of
takings law," 8 it is likely that private property owners will challenge
new regulatory programs to conserve biodiversity as takings of
private property because these programs may substantially restrict
the use of private land." 9 For example, regulatory programs to

118. See supra note 167 (discussing the legal basis for regulatory
takings claims); see also Symposium: Guidance For Growth, 16 U.
PUGET SoUND L. REv. 863 (1993); Lawerence Watters, Colloquium
on Dolan: The Taking Clause Doctrine of the Supreme Court and
the Federal Circuit: Dolan v. City of Tigard: Introduction and
Decision, 25 ENVTL. L. 111 (1995); Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle
Through? Takings JurisprudenceMeets the EndangeredSpecies Act,
38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825 (1997) (detailing analyses of recent
developments in takings law).
119. See, e.g., Saboff v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 200
F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 67 (2000)
(reversing district court's denial of summary judgment regarding the
issue of whether requiring a conservation easement as a condition of
a permit approval constitutes a fifth amendment taking); Glisson v.
Alachua County, 558 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (first
district opinion holding that county land use regulations requiring
protection of wetlands did not amount to a 5th amendment taking);
Fla. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n v. Flotilla Inc., 636 So. 2d
761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (second district opinion holding that
Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission restriction on
development of 48 acres of 173-acre parcel to protect bald eagle
nesting sites did not deprive developer of most or all of its interests
in the property); see also Ira M. Heyman, Property Rights and
Endangered Species Act: A Renascent Assault on Land Use
Regulation, 25 PAC. L.J. 157, 166 (1994) (predicting that U.S. Fish

and Wildlife Service enforcement of ESA protections may lead to an
increase in challenges to the ESA by private land owners asserting
that regulations are resulting in a taking of private property, and
suggesting several mechanisms to avoid or ameliorate takings claims
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protect biodiversity in riparian areas adjacent to some rivers in
Florida involve buffers up to 1100 feet wide, within which most
development is prohibited. 2 In portions of Florida's Green Swamp,
scientists and a task force representing interest groups recommended
that local governments limit housing densities from between one
dwelling unit per 40 acres to one dwelling unit per 100 acres in order
to conserve biodiversity.'12
Both of these examples involve
considerable restrictions on private land use, and would likely
engender takings challenges by property owners. 22 Regardless of
who wins, actual or potential Fifth Amendment taking suits may
discourage new regulatory initiatives to protect biodiversity because
of the high monetary costs involved in defending these suits and
compensating landowners who prevail in court.
In addition to takings suits based on the Fifth Amendment, there is
a significant movement by citizens, interest groups, and states across
the country to reduce government regulation and strengthen private
property rights. 3 For example,. in 1995 the Florida Legislature

under the ESA, and suggesting that in some cases acquisition of
small parcels may be necessary).
120. The 1100-foot wide buffers would conserve about fifty
percent of the wildlife species that use riparian areas. Studies
recommended that no development be allowed within these zones.
However, the buffers would not satisfy the habitat needs of a number
of other species, such as the Florida Redbelly Turtle and the Eastern
Indigo Snake. Schaefer, supra note 13 at C-51-C-52. In fact, the
study found that these species would require buffers of 1,350 and
4,654 feet, respectively. Id.
121. THE GREEN SWAMP TASK FORCE, supra note 46, at 14..
122. But cf, Saboff, 200 F.3d at 1356 (reversing district court's
denial of summary judgment regarding the issue of whether
requiring a conservation easement as a condition of a permit
approval constitutes a fifth amendment taking).
123. See generally Thomas G. Douglas, Jr., Note, Have They Gone
"Too Far"? An Evaluation and Comparison of 1995 State Takings
Legislation, 30 GA. L. REV. 1061, 1070-75 (1996) (describing the
history of the private property rights movement); David Helvarg,
Grassroots for Sale, The Inside Scoop on (Un)Wise Use, THE
AMIcus JoURNAL 24 (Fall 1994); Ronald L. Weaver & Mark D.
Solov, Emerging Property Rights Protection, FLA. BAR J. (June
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adopted legislation to protect private property rights. 24 The law
creates a new cause of action to compensate landowners when
governmental actions impose an "inordinate burden" upon the
landowner's property that does not rise to the level of a taking under
state or federal constitutions.2 5 The apparent motivation behind this
was to quell what the development industry, business interests, and
some property owners viewed as excessive regulation by state
agencies in Florida. 26 The property rights movement can have
significant impacts on attempts by legislatures and local
governments to provide ecosystem and biodiversity protection. Each
of the aforementioned factors-takings claims, private property
rights protection statutes, statutory authority, and heightened
procedural scrutiny-has the potential to hinder development of new
regulatory programs to implement ecosystem management and
conserve biodiversity. Working together, these factors present
formidable barriers to agency rulemaking to implement ecosystem
management and conserve biodiversity.
Agencies in Florida
presently face all four of these factors, a truly chilling prospect.

IV. ANALYSIS OF FLORIDA PROGRAMS

Florida has substantial statutory authority to regulate the
environment, and has used this authority to adopt a complex yet
innovative array of environmental and land use programs.
Conservation of natural resources and ecosystem management are
central themes of many of these programs. Although Florida's
programs are far from perfect-many natural resources remain
seriously threatened-analysis of these programs may provide
insights for other jurisdictions grappling with similar problems. This
1994); Patrick R. Scott, State and Local Regulations: Are We Being
Taken?, FLA. BARJ. (Nov. 1993).
124. 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-181 (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 70.001
(1997)); see David L. Powell et al., Florida'sNew Law to Protect
Private Property Rights, FLA. B. J. 12 (1995).
125. FLA. STAT. ch. 70.001(1) (1997).
126. Douglas, supra note 123, at 1075-76 (citing a Florida
Chamber of Commerce study indicating about 80% of business
people in Florida viewed excessive regulation as Florida's number
one impediment to business).
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Part evaluates the effectiveness and potential of Florida's Growth
Management Act, 127 ecosystem management policy, 28 Area of
Critical State Concern program,' 29 and several ecosystem specific
protection programs. 3 '
A. Comprehensive Land Use Planningand Regulation
1. Overview of Regulatory Framework
Florida's Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land
Development Regulation Act, known as the Growth Management
Act ("GMA"), requires local governments to adopt comprehensive
plans and land development regulations to guide future growth and
development.' 3 ' The Florida Department of Community Affairs
("DCA") reviews local government plans for consistency with
minimum state criteria, 32 and may require local governments to
amend their plans if state criteria are not satisfied.'33 The Act also
establishes eleven regional planning agencies that provide technical
support to local governments and play a role in enforcement of the
If a local government has not prepared all of the required
Act.'
127. FLA. STAT. ch. 163, pt. II.
128. The Fla. Envtl. Reorganization Act, 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93213 § 2(2)(c), (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 20.255 (1997)).
129. FLA. STAT. ch. 380.05; see infra pp. 56-65 and accompanying
text (Florida's Area of Critical State Concern Program provides
greater-than-normal state control over local development activities in
certain geographic regions).
130. See infra pp. 66-95 (discussion of protection programs for the
Wekiva, Econlockhatchee, and Tomoka Rivers).
131. FLA. STAT. ch. 163.3167; see Richard Grosso, Florida's
Growth Management Act: How Far We Have Come, and How Far
We Have Yet to Go, 20 NOVA L. REV. 589 (1996) (for detailed
information about Florida's Growth Management Act); Thomas G.
Pelham, Adequate Public Facilities Requirements: Reflections on
Florida's Concurrency System for Managing Growth, 19 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 973 (1992).
132. FLA. STAT. ch. 163.3177(9).
133. Id. at chs. 163.3177(9), 163.3184.
134. Each of Florida's regional planning agencies must adopt a
regional comprehensive plan. See id. at ch. 186.504 (providing for
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elements, the regional planning agency must prepare the missing
elements and adopt them by rule.'35 After a plan has been approved
by DCA and adopted by a local government, subsequent local
government plan amendments, land development regulations, land
development decisions, and development orders must be consistent
with local, regional, and state plans.'36
The Legislature provided the state with substantial enforcement
authority. Local governments that fail to comply with deadlines for
submitting comprehensive plans are subject to sanctions levied by
Florida's Administration Commission. 3 7
The Administrative
Commission may direct state agencies to withhold funds to increase
the capacity of roads, bridges, or water and sewer systems, within
local governments that are not in compliance with GMA
requirements.3 3 The Administrative Commission may prevent local
governments from obtaining state grants for community
development, recreation development, and revenue sharing.13 The
Act also provides DCA with authority to bring an action in a Florida
circuit court to require local governments to adopt land use
regulations.'
The GMA also allows "affected persons" to
administratively challenge proposed comprehensive plans 4 ' and
creation of regional planning councils); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.
27E-4, 5 (1994) (rules of practice and procedure pertaining to
regional policy plans).
135. FLA. STAT. chs. 163.3167(3), (4) (1997).
136. See id. at chs. 163.3177(9), (10), 163.3194, 163.3202.
137. Id. at ch. 163.3164. Florida, unique within the 50 states, has
an Administration Commission composed of the Florida Governor
and Cabinet. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(a). The cabinet is composed
of an attorney general, a chief financial officer, and a commissioner
of agriculture. The Governor and Cabinet review appeals from
several administrative programs. Id.
138. FLA. STAT. ch. 163.3184(11).
139. Id.
140. Id. at ch. 163.3202(4).
141. Id. at ch. 163.3181(3).
"Affected persons" include the
affected local government; persons owning property, residing, or
owning or operating a business within the boundaries of the local
government whose plan is the subject of the review; and adjoining
local governments that can demonstrate that the plan or plan
amendment will produce substantial impacts on the increased need
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"substantially affected persons" to bring administrative actions to
assure that land development regulations implement and are
consistent with the local comprehensive plan.'
2. Statutory Authority to Conserve Biodiversity
The GMA has potential to conserve biodiversity because it
provides a clear mandate requiring local governments to protect
natural resources, including forests, native vegetation, wildlife,
wetlands, fisheries, and rivers.'43 Local governments must first
collect data and analyze natural resources,'" and then identify these
resources on future land use maps and assign land use categories,
which are consistent with conservation of the resources.'45 The
future land use plans, maps, and land use categories are part of the
local comprehensive plan, and local regulations and development
approvals must be consistent with natural resource protection
provisions of the plan and map. 4 6 Although Florida's approach has
great potential to conserve natural resources, including biodiversity,
several factors impede effective local government protection of
natural systems in Florida.
First, the GMA provides broad authority but very little specific
guidance for local governments to protect natural systems. The lack
of specificity increases the likelihood of inconsistent or inadequate
local government programs. For example, the conservation element

for publicly funded infrastructure or substantial impacts on areas
designated for protection or special treatment within their
jurisdiction. Id. at ch. 163.3184(1)(a).
The legislature did not define
142. Id. at ch 163.3213(1).
"substantially affected persons" in the GMA or Chapter 120 of
Florida's Administrative Procedure Act.
143. Local government conservation elements must provide for
conservation, use, and protection of rivers and related natural
resources, including water, water recharge areas, wetlands, estuarine
marshes, soils, shores, flood plains, forests, and fisheries and
wildlife. Id. at ch. 163.3177(6)(d).
144. FLA. STAT. ch. 163.3177(8).
145. Id. at ch. 163.3177(6)(a).
146. Id. at chs. 163.3177(6)(a), 163.3231, 163.3177(10a) (defining
consistency).
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requires local governments to conserve "wildlife."' 47 Many local
governments have interpreted this to require conservation of species
listed as threatened or endangered by federal or state law, but not of
other wildlife.'48 Second, many local governments do not have
sufficient resources to protect biodiversity. It can be very expensive
to inventory, map, plan, and manage or regulate natural resources.
The ability of local governments to inventory, plan, and regulate
varies widely with the economic and technical capabilities of
individual local governments, and is often linked directly to the size
of the local government's ad valorem tax base.' 49 Thus, rural
counties with low populations generally have less money and
technical capability to devote to environmental protection. 50 This
fact could hinder efforts to conserve biodiversity because many of
the remaining large natural areas are in rural counties.
Local governments are not implementing the Legislature's broad
mandate to conserve natural resources in an even-handed manner.
Like state and federal environmental regulatory programs, local
governments are focusing almost entirely on conserving wetlands
and listed species. While the Act requires local governments to
inventory and designate "environmentally sensitive lands,"'' local
governments have almost uniformly limited this designation to
There are many other habitat types in Florida that are
wetlands.'
regionally or locally important, such as hydric hammock, scrub, and
other uplands. Typically, local governments protect these other
habitats only if species listed as threatened or endangered under state
or federal laws are present. This approach may be inadequate
because 1) the amount of habitat protected is limited to the
147. Id. at ch. 163.3177(6)(d).
148. See, e.g., John Tucker & Richard Hamann, St. Johns River
Water Management District, Regulatory Framework for the
Econlockhatchee River Basin, in II ECONLOCKHATCHEE RIVER
BASIN NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION PLAN

3-5 (1990) (discussing lands protected by comprehensive plans and
land development regulations in Seminole and Orange County,
Florida).
149. ENvTL. LAND MGMT. STUDY COMM., BUILDING SUCCESSFUL
COMMUNITIES, 79-80 (1992) [hereinafterELMS REPORT].
150. Id.
151. See FLA. STAT. ch. 163.3202(2)(e) (1997).
152. See, e.g., Tucker & Hamann, supra note 148, at 18-63.
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immediate area around the listed species and not the larger natural
system, and 2) it is well established that by the time many species
become listed by state and federal endangered species laws the
numbers of individuals may be so low or the habitat so reduced that
continued existence or recovery of the species is extremely
unlikely.'53 Further, there are many species that merit listing but that
have not made it through the administrative listing process,'54 as well
as backlogs in designating critical habitat'55 and adopting recovery
plans for listed species.' 56 Local governments, which fail to
recognize and conserve habitats other than wetlands, will not
conserve biodiversity.
Perhaps more importantly, the state has not required local
governments to adequately protect biodiversity. The Department of
Community Affairs, charged with reviewing and approving or
denying local government comprehensive plans and land
development regulations,' 57 approves plans that do not adequately
protect natural systems and biodiversity.
For example, local
governments with jurisdiction over the Green Swamp adopted
densities of one dwelling unit per twenty acres, which was
subsequently approved by DCA, despite recommendations by
scientists and a task force composed of interest groups that housing
densities ranging from one dwelling unit per forty acres to one
dwelling unit per one hundred acres were necessary to conserve
habitat and wildlife.'58
3. Statutory Authority to Implement Ecosystem Management
The GMA has potential to implement ecosystem management on
private lands because it already includes several provisions

153. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
154. DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 43-48
(1989).
155. Id. at 50-52.
156. Houck, supra note 71, at 345.
157. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
158. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Lake County, No. 91-5960GM 48,
1994 Fla. ENV LEXIS 130 (Fla. Dep't of Comty. Affairs Sept. 8,
1994); THE GREEN SwAMP TASK FORCE, supra note 46, at 14.
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consistent with principles of ecosystem management"' and could be
amended to provide for more complete ecosystem management. The
GMA is appropriate to implement ecosystem management on private
lands because it creates a comprehensive program regulating local
governments, which are the level of government most involved in
controlling land use on private lands.
Land management based on ecological boundaries, not political
boundaries, and interagency cooperation between government
agencies are dominate themes of ecosystem management. 60 In
theory, the GMA has potential to address the extra-jurisdictional
nature of many natural systems because it requires local
governments to coordinate their regulatory programs. 6 ' Therefore,
local governments in Florida should develop programs to protect
natural systems and biodiversity within their jurisdictions, and
coordinate with adjacent local governments and state agencies to
ensure consistent and effective protection. Recently, however, a
committee reviewing environmental and land use regulations in
Florida reported "many shortcomings of local comprehensive plans
as they relate to coordinating governmental decision making and
reviewing development projects."' 62

159. For example, the GMA requires local governments to
coordinate planning and regulatory activities with other units of
government and protect natural resources. Compare FLA. STAT. ch.
163.3177(6)(d) (1997), with ch. 163.3177(6)(h)(1) (highlighting the
conservation element and the intergovernmental coordination
element).
160. See Grumbine, supra note 9 and accompanying text (Principle
3: protect total native diversity; and Principle 7: promote interagency
cooperation).
161. Local government intergovernmental coordination elements
must identify relationships between a local government's
comprehensive plan and the comprehensive plans of adjacent local
governments, regional plans, and the state comprehensive plan. FLA.
STAT. ch. 163.3177(6)(h)(1).
The element must provide for
consideration of the effects of the local plan upon development in
other local governments or state or regional resources. Id. The
element may provide for a voluntary dispute resolution process to
resolve intergovernmental disputes. Id. at ch. 163.3177(6)(h)(1)(c).
162. ELMs REPORT, supra note 149, at 44.
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Intergovernmental coordination by local governments in Florida is
insufficient for several reasons. First, local governments often
continue to take a parochial view, considering local factors only and
failing to coordinate their land use planning and regulatory programs
with adjacent jurisdictions.'63
Yet, protection of complex
interconnected ecosystems requires coordination of planning and
regulation between all levels and jurisdictions of government. For
example, consider a piece of rare scrub habitat, which straddles the
jurisdictional line between two counties. County A allows intense
development of the habitat, while County B prohibits development
of the habitat. Because of the interconnected nature of natural
systems, activities allowed by County A are likely to degrade the
habitat in County B, and may threaten the overall ecology and
biodiversity of the entire habitat.
Perhaps more importantly, the intergovernmental coordination
provisions of the GMA are fundamentally flawed because they fail
to require local governments to adequately coordinate when
developing comprehensive plans and land development regulations.
Instead, intergovernmental coordination most often becomes an issue
after an applicant proposes a project, which may impact an adjacent
local government. Thus, by focusing primarily on minimizing or
resolving specific disputes, intergovernmental coordination becomes
merely a reactive mechanism to resolve conflicts caused by
inconsistent regulatory provisions. One disadvantage of requiring
intergovernmental only at the project stage is that projects gain
momentum from having interested proponents. That sort of pressure
might not exist at the plan stage.
Intergovernmental coordination would be much more effective if
local governments were required to address potential regulatory
conflicts in a proactive manner. For example, if the state required
counties A and B, discussed above, to coordinate in developing their
comprehensive plans and regulations, potential differences in the
degree of protection to be afforded to the scrub habitat could be
resolved before persons began planning and proposing development
163. See, e.g., id. at 38, 78, 79 (discussing shortcomings of the
intergovernmental coordination requirement, yet failing to address
the underlying need to transform intergovernmental coordination
from a reactive procedure to one facilitating cooperation and
consistency in all phases of regulation, including development of
local plans and regulations).
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projects. Such an approach would avoid a host of problems, which
plague the present approach. First, as part of the cooperative
planning process, local governments would be forced to inventory
and assess the regional significance of natural resources and to
consider the regional implications of potential land uses. Second,
and most importantly, a proactive approach would reduce the
likelihood that one local government would permit projects that
would harm natural resources in another local government. This is
because local governments would have to evaluate the regional
significance of natural systems within their jurisdictions, and adopt
regulatory programs to protect the systems, in advance of specific
permit proposals. Third, property owners would have more certainty
regarding allowable land uses. For example, under the present
approach, persons may invest substantial time and money in
projects, which they believe will satisfy applicable local government
regulations, only to have the project halted because of an adjacent
local government's objections. The Legislature should therefore
transform intergovernmental coordination from a reactive procedure
to one that facilitates cooperation and consistency in all phases of
planning and regulation, including development of local plans and
regulations. 164

164. Recent legislative amendments to the intergovernmental
coordination requirements of the GMA have had little positive
impact. These amendments were in large part a response to
recommendations of the ELMs committee that existing
intergovernmental coordination requirements were weak. See ELMs
REPORT, supra note 149, at 38-39. In 1995, the Legislature directed
DCA to appoint a committee to study its intergovernmental
coordination rule and then to develop a draft intergovernmental rule,
subject to approval by the Florida Legislature. Act of June 15, 1995,
1995 Fla. Laws ch. 322.5. In 1996, the legislature amended the
intergovernmental coordination provisions of the GMA, deleting
explicit provisions requiring local governments to develop processes
to 1) determine if development proposals would have impacts on
adjacent jurisdictions, 2) mitigate extra-jurisdictional impacts, and 3)
resolve disputes, and adding provisions establishing a deadline for
local governments to establish inter-local agreements. Act of June 6,
1996, 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 416. The legislative amendments appear
to diminish rather than improve intergovernmental coordination.
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Data collection and use of that data to protect native diversity and
ecological patterns and processes that maintain that diversity are also
dominate themes of ecosystem management.'65 The GMA is
consistent with this theme because it requires that local governments
collect and analyze data and protect natural systems. 166 Human
values and interactions with the environment are also dominate
The Florida program
themes of ecosystem management.'67
that local governments
requires
it
because
theme
implements this
consider economic and sociologic factors as part of the planning
Comprehensive and integrated consideration of
process. 6
environmental, economic, and social factors is crucial69 for
development of an effective ecosystem management program. 1
Management of entire ecologic systems, not individual levels of
systems, is another dominant ecosystem management theme. 7 ' The
Florida approach places responsibility for development of
comprehensive plans at the local level, subject to approval by the
state. "' Local plans must be consistent with regional and state
minimum standards,'72 and must be coordinated with the plans of

165. See Grumbine, supra note 9 and accompanying text (Principle
4: conduct research and collect data and use that information to
improve management).
166. FLA. STAT. ch. 163.3177(8).
167. See Grumbine, supra note 9 and accompanying text (Principle
10: recognize that human values play a dominate role in ecosystem
management goals).
168. FLA. STAT. chs. 163.3161(7), 163.3177(c).
169. Most commentators agree that the term ecosystem
management includes consideration of economic and social factors.
See Grumbine, supra note 9, at 27; GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at
23-25.
170. See Grumbine, supra note 9 and accompanying text (Principle
1: manage entire ecosystems; Principle 2: manage based on
ecological boundaries).
171. FLA. STAT. ch. 163.3177(9).
172. State planning criteria are contained in the GMA, the state
comprehensive plan, and DCA rules. Id. at chs. 163, pt. II, 187;
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5, 9J-24 (9J-5 provides minimum
criteria for review of local government comprehensive plans and
determination of compliance with the GMA).
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adjacent local governments.'73 These requirements may facilitate the
large-scale landscape approach needed for ecosystem management.
The Legislature should amend the GMA and the State
Comprehensive Plan to identify important natural systems and to
require local governments to protect those systems in a consistent
manner.
Despite the criticisms discussed above, the GMA could facilitate
biodiversity conservation and ecosystem management throughout the
state because the GMA already provides sufficient statutory
authority for DCA to implement many ecosystem management
objectives through agency rulemaking. The governor or legislature
should direct DCA to require local governments to incorporate
ecosystem management principles into their comprehensive plans
and regulations.' 74 DCA should establish interagency agreements
with DEP and other Florida agencies to coordinate implementation
of the state's ecosystem management policy. The Legislature should
amend the GMA and expand DCA's regulatory authority to clearly
require local governments to implement ecosystem management and
biodiversity conservation, and to provide DCA with explicit
authority to review local plans and regulations for compliance with
state criteria for ecosystem management biodiversity conservation.
The comprehensive planning process in Florida is still in its
infancy. Although the Act was adopted in 1985, many local
governments were not required to adopt comprehensive plans until
the early 1990s.' 75 The Legislature envisioned comprehensive
planning as a "continuous and ongoing process,"' 76 and required
local governments to conduct evaluation and appraisal reports
("EARs") within seven years of adoption of the initial
comprehensive plan, and then every five years thereafter. 77 The

173. FLA. STAT. ch. 163.3177(6)(h)(1).
174. DCA should amend Rule 9J-5 to require that local
governments implement ecosystem management principles and
conserve biodiversity.
175. FLA. STAT. ch. 163.3167(2)(b) (requiring local governments
to submit comprehensive plans to DCA from July 1, 1989 to July 1,
1991).
176. Id. at ch. 163.3191(1).
177. Id. at ch. 163.3191(5).
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EARs are subject to a sufficiency review by DCA."7 s The EARs
process provides an opportunity for the state and local governments
to update and refine local comprehensive plans to include greater
emphasis on biodiversity conservation and ecosystem management.
B. Ecosystem Management
In 1993, the Florida Legislature directed DEP to develop a
statewide ecosystem management policy to "protect the functions of
entire ecological systems through enhanced coordination of public
acquisition, regulatory, and planning programs."' 79 Borrowing
heavily from Grumbine's ten principles of ecosystem management,'
DEP has produced a substantial body of information 8 ' that reveals
178. Id. at ch. 163.3191(9).
The state may sanction local
governments that fail to comply with the EAR requirements. Id. at
ch. 163.3191(11).
179. 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-213 § 2(2)(c) (codified at FLA. STAT.
ch. 20.255 (1997)).
The provision is part of the Florida
Environmental Reorganization Act, most of which is devoted to
consolidating several agencies and streamlining environmental
permitting programs. Id. DEP defined ecosystem management as
"an integrated, flexible approach to management of Florida's
biological and physical environments-conducted through the use of
tools such as planning, land acquisition, environmental education,
regulation, and pollution prevention-designed to maintain, protect
and improve the state's natural, managed, and human communities."
FLA. DEP'T OF ENvTL. PROT., supra note 18, at 3. The concept of
regulating entire natural systems represents a substantial change
from policies underlying existing regulatory programs in Florida,
most of which focus on regulating only one or two environmental
parameters, without considering ecosystem dynamics or other
important parameters of natural systems.
180. Grumbine's ten principles include: connectedness, ecological
management, ecological integrity, data collection, evaluation/
auditing,
adaptive
management,
interagency
cooperation,
organizational change, humans are critical, and human values. FLA.
DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 18, at 1-2; Grumbine, supra
note 9.
181. DEP has established three primary goals for its ecosystem
management policy: 1) better protection and management of
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the agency considers biodiversity protection to be a fundamental
12
component of the state's overall ecosystem management policy.
However, it is unlikely that DEP will adequately protect biodiversity
because the Legislature failed to provide any meaningful substantive
statutory authority for ecosystem management. This weakness is
critical because existing authority is inadequate to require
biodiversity conservation on private lands. Further, although the
new policy sets lofty goals of providing for the needs of natural
systems and humans,'83 the Legislature provided no guidance on how
Florida's ecosystems, 2) agency structure and culture based on
ecosystem management, and 3) public ethic of shared responsibility
for the environment. FLA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 18, at

3. DEP has developed a four step planning process in order to
achieve these goals. The first step involves background research
The second step involves
into ecosystem management.
implementing six model ecosystem management projects in Florida.
The six ecosystem management areas are the: Apalachicola River
and Bay, Lower St. Johns River, Florida Bay, Wekiva River,
Hillsborough River, and Suwannee River. Letter from Virginia B.
Wetherell, Secretary, Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., to the general public
(Feb. 25, 1994) (document containing a description and initial
assessment of these six areas and on file with the Fordham
Environmental Law Journal). The third step is to develop an
ecosystem management strategy ("EMIS") to guide DEP. DEP
made a commendable effort to obtain input from diverse interests in
developing the EMIS. For example, in addition to establishing
twelve committees to address ecosystem management issues, DEP
conducted a series of public hearings throughout the state to solicit
information and created an ecosystem database for the public to
obtain information or comment on the new policy. The final step is
for DEP and the water management districts to develop area
implementation strategies for regions throughout Florida. Id.
182. In discussing the principle of ecological integrity, DEP states
that it is necessary to "protect, maintain, and restore native diversity,
ecological patterns, and the processes that maintain diversity." FLA.
DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 18, at 4.

Clearly, DEP

acknowledges the importance of conserving biodiversity to the
overall ecological integrity of natural systems.
183. The new policy has a decidedly anthropocentric orientation.
For example, human needs are expressly recognized in DEP's
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to weigh and balance environmental, social, economic, and cultural
values. 184
As the principal environmental regulatory agency in Florida, DEP
is a logical choice to oversee the state's ecosystem management
program.'85 However, it is far from clear whether DEP has sufficient
regulatory authority to exert mandatory planning or regulatory
criteria over other state agencies. Other than a general supervisory
role over the state's five water management districts,'86 DEP has no
clear statutory authority to require other agencies, governments, and
individuals to comply with ecosystem management.'87
The Legislature's directive to protect ecosystems through
"enhanced coordination of public acquisition, regulatory, and
planning programs" illustrates its intent to rely on existing
mechanisms and authority. The Legislature provided DEP with
almost no guidance as to how to achieve this goal, nor did it provide
DEP with any substantive regulatory authority beyond existing
programs.
Essentially, the legislation directs DEP to protect
ecological systems through "enhanced coordination" of existing
programs. Consequently, DEP is focusing primarily on developing
definitions of ecosystem and ecosystem management, as well as
throughout initial planning documents. Id. at 3.
184. Lack of substantive statutory standards often leads to
ineffective regulatory programs. For example, commentators have
criticized the multiple-use sustained yield policy of the National
Forest Management Act because it directs the National Forest
Service to consider multiple values (including outdoor recreation,
range, timber, watershed, wildlife, fish, and wilderness), but
provides the agency with overly broad discretion to balance the
values when they come into conflict. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601(d)(1),
1604(e)(1), 1604(g)(3)(A) (1988).
185. DEP's organic statute, the Florida Air and Water Pollution
Control Act, provides the agency with a general grant of authority to
conserve the natural resources of the state. FLA. STAT. chs. 403.021,
403.061 (1997).
186. Id. at ch. 373.026(7).
187. Id. at ch. 403.081 (stating "[a]ll state agencies . . . shall be
available to the department to perform, at its direction, the duties
required of the department under this act," may provide authority for
DEP to require other agencies to implement ecosystem
management).
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non-regulatory mechanisms and enhancing coordination of
regulatory programs. For example, out of twelve committees formed
by DEP to help develop its ecosystem management implementation
strategy, none is devoted to regulatory initiatives, other than to
improve intergovernmental coordination. 8 '
DEP considers its ecosystem management program for the Wekiva
River Basin a successful model of the state's new ecosystem
management program.'89 Ironically, the Wekiva River is one of the
few natural systems in Florida for which the legislature provided
clear substantive authority requiring regulators to protect wildlife
and wildlife habitat. 9 ' Portraying the Wekiva ecosystem as a
successful example of Florida's new ecosystem management
program is somewhat misleading because a regulatory program to
protect biodiversity on privately owned lands was already in place at
the time the state adopted its ecosystem management policy. 9 ' The
important lesson from the Wekiva River ecosystem management
program is that when "enhanced coordination" of existing programs
includes a regulatory program, which protects wildlife habitat, the
program is likely to conserve biodiversity. The Florida Legislature
should provide DEP and the state's water management districts 92
with clear authority to regulate upland habitat to benefit all species.
The Florida Legislature amended the ecosystem management
portions of DEP's organic statute in 1996 and 1997, but failed to
strengthen DEP's regulatory authority. 93 The 1997 amendments
188. DEP formed the following committees to explore issues
relating to ecosystem management in Florida: Land Acquisitions
and Greenways, Public Lands Management, The Role of Private
Landowners, Education, Science and Technology, Pollution
Prevention, Intergovernmental Coordination, Training, Audit and
Evaluation, Incentive-based Regulatory Alternatives, and External
Steering Committee. FLA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 48, at
4.
189. Letter from Wetherell to the general public, supra note 181, at
2.
190. See FLA. STAT. ch. 373.415(1).
191. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40C-41.063(3)(e) (1995).
192. Florida has five water management districts that regulate
water resources. See infra Part IV.C. 1.
193. In 1996, the Legislature created the Ecosystem Management
and Trust Fund to support management and restoration of
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may actually weaken existing regulations by authorizing voluntary
ecosystem management agreements between DEP and regulated
entities to "better coordinate the legal requirements and timelines
applicable to a regulated activity."' 94 DEP may enter into an
agreement if the agency determines that there is "net ecosystem
benefit to the subject ecosystem more favorable than operation under
applicable rules."'9 5 While it is doubtful that DEP can legally waive
existing regulatory requirements, the policy has engendered
substantial criticism.'96 In an apparent further retreat from ecosystem
management, the Legislature recently amended the statute to delete
the position of executive coordinator for ecosystem management and

ecosystems. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-176 § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT.
ch. 403.1651 (1997)). In 1997, the legislature again amended DEP's
organic statute, adding legislative findings in support of ecosystem
management, recognizing intergovernmental coordination as
important element, and re-affirming DEP as the appropriate lead
agency. FLA. STAT. ch. 403.075.
194. Id. at ch. 403.0752. Ecosystem management agreements may
include incentives for participation and implementation by a
regulated entity, including: 1) coordinated regulatory contact per
facility, 2) permitting process flexibility, 3) expedited permit
processing, 4) alternative monitoring and reporting requirements, 5)
coordinated permitting and inspections, 6) cooperative inspections
that provide opportunity for informal resolution of compliance issues
before enforcement action is initiated, and 7) alternative means of
environmental protection. Id. at ch. 403.0752(4).
195. Id. at ch. 403.0752(2). DEP must also determine 1) the
agreement will not conflict with federal programs, 2) the agreement
will result in a reduction in overall risks to human health and the
environment, and 3) the regulated entity has sufficient ability to
implement the agreement. Id.
196. Recent experience indicates DEP may be providing marginal
protection for the environment. Citizens and DEP employees have
widely criticized DEP's new ecosystem management policy as
bending over backwards to please regulated interests, at the expense
of satisfying environmental laws. See, e.g., Jan Hollingsworth, State
Lax in Enforcing Environmental Rules, Group Says, THE TAMPA
TRIBuNE, Feb. 24, 1998, Metro, at 6.
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the office of ecosystem planning and coordination from DEP's
organizational structure.'97
Recent amendments seem designed to codify DEP's new
streamlined and flexible permitting approach, rather than provide
meaningful direction. DEP is unlikely to adequately protect upland
habitat and wildlife because existing statutes provide insufficient
authority and the amendments provide no new substantive authority.
The legislature should remedy this by providing DEP and the state's
water management districts'98 with clear authority to regulate upland
habitat to benefit all species.
C. Water Management Districtsand Water Resources
1. Institutional Overview
The federal Clean Water Act relies almost entirely upon state
nonpoint source programs to regulate complex interactions between
land uses and water resources. In Florida, water management
districts ("WMDs")

99

regulate water resources, including nonpoint

source pollution, through surface water management2. 0 and ground
water'O permitting programs. Each district administers similar, but
distinct permitting programs. 22 These programs regulate activities
that affect wetlands and surface waters.
197. 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 00-197 § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. Ch.
20.255(2)(a) (2000).
198. See infra Part IV.C. 1 (describing Florida's water management
districts).
199. Structurally, a nine-member governing board, appointed by
the Governor and subject to confirmation by the senate, governs
each district. FLA. STAT. ch. 373.073(1)(a) (1997). Unlike the other
four districts, the Southwest Florida Water Management District has
eleven members. Governing board members serve for four-year
terms, and must reside within the respective district. Id. at ch.
373.073(1)(a). Each governing board selects an executive director,
subject to approval by the Governor and the Senate, who oversees
daily operations of the districts. Id. at ch 373.079(4)(a).
200. Id. at ch. 373, pt. IV.
201. Id. at ch 373, pt. II.
202. Generally the largest three WMDs (South Florida, Southwest
Florida, and St. Johns River Water Management Districts) have the
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Florida's water management districts are well suited to regulating
many natural systems because their geographic jurisdiction is based
on the boundaries of the state's five major watersheds. Thus, many
natural systems are contained entirely within one water management
district. 23 The districts have broad statutory authority to regulate
activities that affect the water resources of the state.2 4 Figure A
depicts Florida's water management district boundaries.

most extensive permitting programs and the two smaller districts
(Northwest Florida and Suwanee River Water Management
Districts) have less comprehensive regulatory programs. See id. at
ch. 373.073(2)(a).
203. Some natural systems in Florida extend beyond the
boundaries of one water management district, such as the Green
Swamp system, which includes area within the Southwest Florida
Water Management District and the St. Johns River Water
Management District. See id. at ch. 373.069.
204. The districts have authority to regulate activities that impact
"water resources," including ground water and surface water and
wetlands (including isolated wetlands). Administrative judges have
interpreted this statutory authority to extend to aquatic and wetlanddependent species, but not to uplands. See id. at ch. 373, pts. II, IV;
see also infra note 344 and accompanying text.
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Figure A: Florida Water Management Districts
Historically, the districts have functioned fairly efficiently, due in
large part to their relatively steady source of funding, which comes
primarily from ad valorem taxes levied by each district, as well as
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through general appropriations and permit fees. 205 Districts with
large populations have substantial budgets, infrastructure, and staff,
while districts in rural areas have fewer resources.2 °6
The Florida Water Resources Act ("WRA") directs DEP and the
state's five WvMDs to regulate activities, which manage and store
surface waters, including impacts to wetlands. 207 Development
activities, which disrupt natural surface drainage patterns, may
adversely affect water quality and quantity, as well as fish, wildlife,
and their habitat. Almost all development activities in Florida
require manipulation of surface water, and thus most require a WMD
permit.0"
2. Limitations on Water Management District Authority
At first glance, the WMD would seem to be an appropriate agency
to regulate natural systems because most land development activities
result in some degree of manipulation of surface drainage patterns.
However, the scope of inquiry under the WRA is limited to activities
affecting the "water resources" of the state, and does not extend to
species that are not aquatic or wetland dependent.0 9 Accordingly,
upland habitat and species, which may be affected by development,
do not fall within the jurisdiction of the WRA. For example, the
habitat needs of non-listed species which are nonetheless
experiencing substantial declines, such as the striped newt, central
Florida crowned snake, and short-tailed hawk, are not considered
205. FLA. STAT. ch. 373.503(1) (1997). The Florida Constitution
establishes maximum allowable millages for the water management
districts. FLA. CONST. art. 7, § 9(b).
206. The South Florida Water Management District, Southwest
Florida Water Management District, and St. Johns River Water
Management District have substantial budgets and infrastructure.
207. FLA. STAT. ch. 373, pt. IV.
208. The Legislature exempted agricultural and "silvicultural"
activities that are not for the "sole or predominate purpose of
impounding or obstructing surface waters." Id. at ch. 373.406.
209. Friends of Fort George, Inc. v. Fairfield Cmtys., Inc., Nos. 853537, 85-3596, 1986 Fla. Div. Adm. Hearings LEXIS 4106 (Oct. 6,
1986); St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Consol.-Tomoka Land
Co., 717 So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), reh'g denied, 727 So.
2d 904 (Fla. 1999).
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under the WRA permitting program.2 0 Part IV.D.2 discusses the
District's statutory authority in greater detail.
Wetlands regulations may fail to protect certain types of wetland
habitat. For example, the Legislature authorized the districts to
disregard the impacts of development activities on fish and wildlife
and their habitat in wetlands that fall below certain size thresholds
established by the districts.2 1
The districts must base these
thresholds on biological and hydrological evidence, which shows the
fish and wildlife values of such areas are minimal. 2 The districts
must protect threatened and endangered species regardless of
wetland size. 213 However, certain non-listed species of amphibians,
including the southern chorus frog and the eastern spadefoot toad,
are dependent upon small ephemeral wetlands for their existence. 1 4
3. Mitigation
The use of mitigation to offset adverse impacts to the environment
also undercuts the effectiveness of the WRA in protecting watershed
integrity.2"5 In theory, regulators can use mitigation to allow
210. Schaefer, supra note 13, at 3-31-3-32. The Florida Game and
Fish Commission classified these species as imperiled (vulnerable to
extinction), a classification which provides no legal protection.
None of the species are listed under federal or state endangered
species protection statutes. Id.
211. FLA. STAT. ch. 373.414(2).
212. Id. at ch. 373.414(2)(a); see Sierra Club v. St. Johns River
Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 90-5835R, 1990 Fla. ENV LEXIS 192 (Fla.
Div. of Admin. Hearings Dec. 18, 1990) (invalidating St. Johns
River Water Management District permitting thresholds that failed to
consider impacts to certain isolated wetlands that exceeded the
District's 0.5 acre permitting threshold).
213. FLA. STAT. ch. 373.414(2)(b).
214. Schaefer, supra note 13, at 3-25; see also ROBIN HART &
JAMES R. NEWMAN, FLORIDA GAME AND FRESH WATER FISH COMM.
NONGAME WILDLIFE PROGRAM,

THE IMPORTANCE OF ISOLATED

WETLANDS TO FISH AND WILDLIFE IN FLORIDA

22 (1990).

215. Mitigation is the practice of creating, restoring, enhancing, or
preserving habitat to offset adverse environmental impacts caused by
a development activity. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE ON ENvTL. POLICY,
PROTECTING AMERICA'S

WETLANDS:

A FAIR,

FLEXIBLE,

AND
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development to continue in wetlands, while offsetting adverse
impacts to natural resources, including biodiversity. Theoretically,
habitat values or functions which are harmed by a project can be
protected or re-created elsewhere.216 In fact, this is what the Florida
Legislature attempted to do by requiring the WMDs to consider
proposals for mitigation for projects, which fail to satisfy permitting
criteria. 2 l7 However, the use of mitigation in Florida has resulted in
substantial destruction of wildlife and habitat.218
Mitigation has failed for several reasons. First, early mitigation
programs favored type-for-type and on-site mitigation. 219 These
programs were plagued with problems, including inappropriate use
EFFECTIVE APPROACH (1993). Mitigation is often required by
government environmental agencies as a condition of obtaining a
development permit for a specific project. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch.
373.414(1)(b). Mitigation may occur at the site of the adverse
impacts (on-site mitigation), or may occur at some other location
(off-site mitigation). Mitigation may involve conserving, restoring,
or creating habitat of the same type as that adversely impacted (typefor-type mitigation), or of a different type of habitat (non-type-fortype mitigation). John H. Hankinson, Jr., Mitigation of Wetland
Impacts in Florida:Policy Development and PracticalApplication,
in WETLAND PROTECTION: STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE

STATES 334-36.
216. Ann Redmond, How Successful is Mitigation, 14 NAT'L
WETLANDS NEWSLETTER 5 (1992).
217. FLA. STAT. ch. 373.414(1)(b).
218. Mitigation for degraded or destroyed wetlands does not
guarantee "no net loss" of wetlands. A 1991 study by the Florida
Department of Environmental Regulation found that during the late
1980s the Department issued permits authorizing the loss of 3505
acres of wetlands, and mitigated that loss through creation,
enhancement, and preservation of about 18,231 acres of wetlands.
However, the same study found an extremely high rate of
noncompliance. Only four of 63 permits reviewed were found to be
in full compliance with mitigation requirements of the permit. The
success rate for freshwater mitigation was a dismal 12 percent, while
45 percent of tidal mitigation was successful. FLA. DEP'T. OF
ENvTL. REGULATION, REPORT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PERMITTED
MITIGATION 3-4 (1991) [hereinafterDEP MITIGATION REPORT].

219. See supra note 215 (discussing types of mitigation).
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of mitigation, such as attempts to create wetlands in well drained
sandy soils; high failure rates, due to use of poor techniques to
construct mitigation areas; and low levels of compliance, due to lax
monitoring and enforcement of mitigation projects.220 In fact, several
commentators reported that only about one-quarter of mitigation
22
projects in Florida successfully produced functional wetlands. '
More recently, agencies have begun to focus on using mitigation to
protect other types of habitat, including uplands, through the use of
off-site and non-type mitigation.222 The new trend in mitigation
allows the conservation of large tracts of one or more habitat types in
Florida. 23 A recent example involves the use of mitigation to offset
destruction of numerous small wetlands by an expressway project in
central Florida.2 4 The old approach to mitigation would have
220. DEP MITIGATION REPORT, supra note 218, at 5-7, 14-18;
Tucker & Hamann, supra note 148, at 78.
221. See Redmond, supra note 216, at 5-6; Roy R. Lewis, Why
Florida Needs Mitigation Banking, 14 NAT'L WETLANDS
NEWSLETTER 7 (1992). Mitigation under Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act is also flawed. See generally Michael C. Blumm, The
Clinton Wetlands Plan: No Net Gain in Wetlands Protection, 9 J.
LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 227 (1994).
222. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 373.4135 (1997) (finding that
"mitigation banks and offsite regional mitigation can enhance the
certainty of mitigation and provide ecological value due to the
improved likelihood of environmental success," and directing the
DEP and water management districts to participate in and encourage
mitigation banks and offsite regional mitigation); see also id. at ch.
373.4137 (directing the Florida Department of Transportation to use
regional long-range mitigation planning to offset adverse effects of
transportation projects, rather than on a project-by-project basis).
223. Management of these areas .is typically for natural functions,
and may be conducted by government agencies or private entities.
The long-term conservation of mitigation areas is assured because
the government or a private trust usually obtains title or a
conservation easement over the property.
224. Id. at ch. 338.250 (providing that adverse effects of the
Central Florida Beltway be mitigated through acquisition of lands,
restoration, or creation of lands providing regional environmental
benefit); see ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MGMT. DIST. & S. FLA.
WATER

MGMT.

DIST.,

CONCEPTUAL

PLAN

FOR

WETLAND
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required developers to create, restore, or preserve a small wetland for
each wetland destroyed or degraded by the project. Under the new
approach, the policymakers determined that the net environmental
benefit would be greatest if a large off-site tract composed of
wetlands and uplands was preserved. 25
While the use of off-site and non-type mitigation avoids some of
the pitfalls of early mitigation efforts, the approach also suffers from
serious deficiencies. For example, non-type and off-site mitigation
require regulators to make quantitative and qualitative decisions
regarding the relative value of different types of habitat. Regulators
must not only decide what type of habitat must be conserved in
exchange for allowing destruction of another type of habitat, but
they must also decide how much habitat must be conserved.2 6
Valuation of habitats can be exceedingly complex and subjective.2 7
Agencies are accepting mitigation, as mandated by the Legislature,
but mitigation ratios may not be based on scientific studies of the

MITIGATION, SOUTHERN CONNECTOR, CENTRAL FLORIDA BELTWAY

(1990) [hereinafterCONCEPTUAL PLAN FOR WETLAND MITIGATION]
(a report jointly authored by two divisions of the Florida
Management. District); see also Flournoy, supra note 61, at 120-21
(discussing the Disney Wilderness Preserve which mitigates impacts
to wetlands from Disney's twenty-year build-out plan).
225. CONCEPTUAL PLAN FOR WETLAND MITIGATION, supra note
224, at i-iii.
226. For example, the following DEP definition of "mitigation
credits" requires agencies to assess and compare ecological value of
uplands and wetlands. A mitigation credit is a unit of measure
which represents the increase in ecological value resulting from
restoration, enhancement, preservation, or creation activities. FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-342.200(5) (1994). Mitigation credits
assigned for enhancement, restoration or preservation of wetlands or
uplands will be based on the extent of improvement in ecological
value resulting from these activities relative to* that obtained by
successfully creating one acre of wetland. Id. at r. 62-342.470(2).
227. See David Smith, Comparing Apples to Oranges, 19 NAT'L
WETLANDS NEWSLETTER 11 (1997)

(discussing the tremendous

variation in how wetland loss and restoration data are defined,
measured, tracked, and reported).
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relative value of different habitats.22
Nor has there been any
comprehensive statewide assessment of cumulative impacts to
habitats. Without this information, it is difficult for regulators to
determine the direct and indirect effects of projects. Permitting
decisions are being made on the basis of inadequate information.
There is no certainty that the types of habitats being preserved are
important for conservation, nor is there any certainty that mitigation
is preventing net loss of certain habitats, or is tied to conserving
overall natural system integrity.
Despite the limitations discussed above, non-type mitigation and
mitigation banking hold great potential for protecting certain natural
systems. 29 Mitigation can be used to support purchase and
ecosystem management of large tracts of preserved natural land.
Mitigation could also allow development activities, which might
otherwise violate regulatory programs to go forward in exchange for
money or direct preservation of forests or other habitat types in other
locations. Another mitigation alternative would be to require that
certain lands be managed in conformance with ecosystem
management or biodiversity conservation criteria.
D. Designationand Protection of Special Areas
1. Green Swamp Area of Critical State Concern
a. Overview
Florida has a program to identify and regulate areas of ecological
importance to the entire state.230 The Legislature has designated the
Florida Keys, city of Key West, Big Cypress Swamp, Green Swamp,
and the Apalachicola Bay area as Areas of Critical State Concern
because they have statewide significance.' Figure B depicts, on the
following page, Florida's ACSCs. The state adopted principles for
228. See Redmond, supra note 216, at 6 (discussing the need to
develop guidance for determining enhancement-to-loss-ratios);
Lewis, supra note 221, at 7 (discussing the need to establish clear,
safe mitigation ratios for each wetland type).
229. See generally Flournoy, supra note 61, at 120-22.
230. FLA. STAT. ch. 380.012 (1997) (referred to as the Florida
Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972).
231. ELMs REPORT, supra note 149, at 84.
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guiding development to control land use in each of the five areas"'
and local governments must implement the principles through their
comprehensive plans and land development regulations.233 Local
governments must provide the state with notice of applications for
development permits within ACSCs.2 4"
The Department of
Community Affairs has authority to initiate an administrative
proceeding to enjoin local development approvals that violate the
principles or local plans or regulations, and to compel local
governments to properly administer critical area regulations.2 35 The
state also evaluates local compliance with the ACSC requirements as
part of its review of local comprehensive plans and plan amendments
pursuant to the GMA. 36 While the ACSC statute provides broad
authority regarding the specific purposes for which the Legislature
can designate ACSCs, 237 most have focused on conservation of water
resources and listed species. The Legislature intended for ACSC
designations to be temporary, providing for de-designation when the
state was satisfied local governments were adequately protecting the
resource, yet the state has not yet de-designated any ACSCs. 38
232. See, e.g., FLA. ADMi. CODE ANN. r. 28-26 (1995) (discussing
boundary and principles for guiding development for the Green
Swamp Area of Critical State Concern).
233. FLA. STAT. ch. 380.05(6).
234. Id. at ch. 380.05(19).
235. Id. at ch. 380.11(2)(c).
236. See id. at chs. 163.3177(4)(b), 163.3184(14).
237. See id. at ch. 380.05(2)(a). This chapter provides for ACSC
designation of areas
containing, or having a significant impact upon,
environmental or natural resources of regional or
statewide importance, including ... state or federal parks,
forests, wildlife refuges, wilderness areas, aquatic
preserves, major rivers . . . , state environmentally
endangered lands, Outstanding Florida Waters, and
aquifer recharge areas, the uncontrolled private or public
development of which would cause substantial
deterioration of such resources.
Id.
238. See id. at ch. 380.05(12). The state may not de-designate
unless the local governments have been successfully implementing
the ACSC requirements for at least one year. Id.
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Figure B: Florida Areas of Critical State Concern
The Green Swamp system provides an interesting case study in
natural resource management. The system covers about 556,000
acres of wetlands, rivers and uplands, serves as the headwaters of
five rivers, contains the potentiometric high of Florida's principal
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aquifer,"' and contains important wildlife habitat for a variety of
species."24 The system is one of the larger areas of intact habitat still
left in Florida. Much of the important wildlife habitat is located on
private lands, which compose a substantial portion of the Green
Swamp ecosystem.
In the late 1970's, the Governor and Cabinet24 ' designated 322,690
acres of the Green Swamp in Lake and Polk Counties as Florida's
second ACSC.242 The system was designated an ACSC because of
its unique hydrologic values.243 In 1974, the Governor and Cabinet
adopted the Green Swamp Principles for Guiding Development244
and land development regulations 245 to protect the hydrologic
resources of the Green Swamp. For example, the Principles
prohibited site alteration that would alter surface water flows and
reduce natural recharge. 246 The ACSC designation required local
governments to administer these land development regulations,
subject to oversight by the state.
b. Critique of Green Swamp ACSC Program
During the early 1980s the DCA and local governments largely
ignored the ACSC designation for the Green Swamp. 247 Not only did
local governments often fail to send notice of development approvals
to DCA, as required by the ACSC statute, 24 ' but also DCA did not
239. See THE GREEN SWAMP TASK FORCE, supra note 46, at 1-1-116.
240. See THE GREEN SwAMP TASK FORCE, supra note 46, at 2-1-22.
241. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. Art. IV, § 4(a).
242. See FLA. STAT. ch. 380.0551 (1997) (designating the Green
Swamp Area as Area of Critical State Concern, effective July 1,
1979).
243. See FLA. DIV. OF STATE PLANNING, FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PROPOSED GREEN SWAMP AREA OF

CRITICAL STATE CONCERN, LAKE AND POLK CoUNTIEs, FLORIDA 20

(1974).
244. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 28-26.003 (1974).

245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at r. 28-27, 28-28 (1975).
Id. at r. 28-26.003(2)(a)(b) (1974).
See THE GREEN SWAMP TASK FORCE, supra note 46, at 4-28.
FLA. STAT. ch. 380.05(19) (1997).
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adequately pursue enforcement of the notice requirement.249 In
addition, local governments and DCA criticized the Principles for
Guiding Development as being too general to provide local
governments with adequate guidance."' This lack of specificity in
the Principles for Guiding Development fostered uncertainty as to
what is actually required to meet the objectives of the ACSC
designation. For example, a monitoring report, conducted by DCA
in 1987, found that both DCA and Polk County continued to
authorize projects designed using inappropriate methodologies and
based on insufficient data because the rule contained outdated
"'
methodologies and was vague on many key issues.25
The ACSC program holds little potential to bring about widespread
biodiversity conservation. The program has been only marginally
successful,25 2 largely because there has been substantial local

government and citizen opposition to the program, and the state has
been less than diligent in implementing and enforcing its provisions.
Local governments have generally opposed the program because it
usurps local authority and imposes substantial obligations on local
governments that fall within ACSC boundaries. Given the history of
the program and today's political trend toward reducing government,
it is unlikely that the Legislature will designate any new ACSCs, or
that local governments will request to become ACSCs. Ironically, a
state committee recently recommended the ACSC program be used
to protect additional natural areas in Florida, despite the substantial
difficulties the program has encountered thus far. 53
The Green Swamp ACSC also fails to satisfy a fundamental
principle of ecosystem management-that management programs
must include the entire natural system.25 The Green Swamp ACSC
249. See THE GREEN SWAMP TASK FORCE, supra note 46, at 4-29.
250. Id.
251. See FLA. DEP'T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, GREEN SWAMP ACSC

42 (1987).
252. The fact that the state has not de-designated any ACSCs is an
indicator of the program's marginal performance. Several ACSCs
have been designated for over 20 years. Further, the DCA has
acknowledged the program's shortcomings in its own reports. See
id.
253. See ELMS REPORT, supra note 149, at 86-87.
254. See supra Parts III.A-B (discussing anthropocentric versus
natural boundaries and intergovernmental coordination).
SUMMARY OF MONITORING PERIOD FOR POLK COUNTY
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includes only about 58 percent of the Green Swamp system. Thus,
less stringently regulated activities outside the ACSC boundaries
may adversely effect natural resources within the ACSC.
It was not until the late 1980's that the state began taking a closer
look at local management of the system. 255 Ultimately, DCA
determined that both Lake and Polk Counties comprehensive plans
were in noncompliance because numerous provisions in the plans
were inconsistent with the GMA, the state comprehensive plan, and
the ACSC statute.256 For example, the Polk County comprehensive
plan did not depict a conservation land use category, protect
wetlands and hydrologic functions, protect native vegetative
communities, protect threatened ecological communities, or define
As part of a negotiated
environmentally sensitive areas.257
settlement, Polk County agreed to appoint a task force to conduct an
its comprehensive
in depth study of the Green Swamp and to amend
28
system.
the
for
protection
plan to provide more
One of the principal findings of the Green Swamp Study was that
the Green Swamp minimum standards were inadequate because they
only addressed hydrologic functions and did not protect important
wildlife habitat values or ecosystem integrity.259 While in 1974 the
Green Swamp was considered valuable primarily for its hydrologic
functions, the study identified other important and unique values,
including, but not limited to wildlife, wildlife habitat, wildlife
corridors, recreation, aesthetics, and rare or unique habitat.2 60 The
255. The state's renewed interest occurred for two reasons. First,
the DCA began reviewing local government comprehensive plans as
Second, development proposals
required by the new GMA.
increased dramatically during the late 1980s as Orlando continued to
boom and spread westward.
256. See Notice of Intent to Find the Lake County Comprehensive
Plan Not in Compliance, Docket No. 91-NOI-3501-(N) (Fla. Dept.
of Cmty. Affairs Aug. 30, 1991); Notice of Intent to Find the Polk
County Comprehensive Plan Not in Compliance, Docket No. 90NOI-3501-(N) (Fla. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs June 13, 1991)
[hereinafterPolk County Notice of Non-compliance].
257. Polk County Notice of Non-compliance, supra note 256, at 5,
9-15.
258. THE GREEN SwAMP TASK FORCE, supra note 46, at 4-28-4-29.
259. THE GREEN SwAMP TASK FORCE, supra note 46, at 4-30.
260. THE GREEN SwAMP TASK FORCE, supra note 46.
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study also recommended an alternative institutional structure to
manage the Green Swamp System.
c. ProposedAlternative Green Swamp Program
The Green Swamp Task Force proposed an interesting solution to
protect the ecological integrity of the Green Swamp System.
Modeled on the approach used for the New Jersey Pinelands,"' the
Task Force recommended creation of a regional commission with
authority to develop and adopt a comprehensive management plan
for tle entire system, including designation of core preservation
areas to protect wildlife and habitat.262 Local governments would
then implement the plan through their comprehensive plans and land
development regulations. A regional plan and authority would
provide local governments with broader development review
authority than exists under the ACSC program. Under the existing
ACSC regulatory program, local governments make initial
development review decisions, which are then subject to review and
reversal by DCA. Under a regional plan and authority, local
governments would retain initial development review authority and
would gain a degree of final development review authority by virtue
of their representation on the regional authority. DCA would
surrender its individual development review authority to the regional
authority, but would retain general oversight authority.
Local government response to the recommendations for a Green
Swamp regional commission was less than enthusiastic, despite the
opportunity to possibly be de-designated as an ACSC. Dedesignation is desirable for local governments within ACSCs
because the ACSC program requires that they comply with standards
developed by the state, whereas the proposed approach would
involve local governments in the development of regional criteria
and would provide for local representation on a regional oversight
commission. The local governments chose to risk a non-compliance
action by DCA26 3 rather than comply with state pressure and Green

261. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
262. THE GREEN SWAMP TASK FORCE, supra note 46, at 9, 14, 23,
24.

263. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing DCA
enforcement of ACSC requirements); see also supra notes 137-42
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Swamp Task Force recommendations that the counties coordinate in
conserving the natural resources of the Green Swamp, including its
biodiversity. Ultimately, the DCA and local governments reached a
settlement, which scientists warned would not provide for adequate
biodiversity conservation.6
Policymakers and regulators should consider the proposed Green
Swamp approach for other ecosystems because it resolves several of
the barriers to ecosystem management and biodiversity conservation
identified in Part III of this article. A comprehensive plan would
ensure that the Green Swamp is managed from an ecosystem
perspective rather than along existing jurisdictional lines. This is
particularly important because the Green Swamp is a multijurisdictional resource, with many of its natural resource functions
being shared by two or more jurisdictions. 265 A comprehensive plan
would identify areas of ecological importance and designate
appropriate levels of development for those areas. A regional
authority could also ensure consistent application of the
comprehensive plan.
Existing governmental entities provide
inconsistent regulation, often resulting in contradictory and
haphazard protection of natural functions. A regional authority for
the entire resource would eliminate these problems because final
development review authority would reside in one reviewing body.
A regional plan and development review authority would facilitate
assessment of the cumulative adverse effects of development on the
entire Green Swamp. Existing agency regulatory programs do not
track the overall effects of individual development activities on the
natural resources of the Green Swamp.
Jurisdictional lines
inherently limit local government perspectives. A regional plan with
appropriate land use designations and monitoring mechanisms would
and accompanying text (discussing DCA enforcement and sanctions
for violation of GMA requirements).
264. The county comprehensive plans designate a density of one
dwelling unit per 20 acres for the core preservation area, instead of
the one dwelling unit per 40 acres to one dwelling unit per 100 acres
recommended by scientists and the Green Swamp Task Force. THE
GREEN SwAMP TASK FORCE, supra note 46, at 14.
265. THE GREEN SWAMP TASK FORCE, supra note 46, at 14. Five

counties (Lake, Polk, Pasco, Hernando, and Sumter), two water
management districts, and numerous state and federal agencies share
jurisdiction over the Green Swamp. Id.
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enable both local governments and the regional authority to
determine the cumulative impacts of development.
An effective regional plan and review authority could speed the
way to de-designation of the Green Swamp ACSC. The ACSC
program was intended to provide a temporary process, which would
be dissolved after local governments demonstrated that they had
achieved state goals for protection of the resource.266 An effective
regional plan and review authority would probably satisfy the
concerns of the state and lead to de-designation.
A comprehensive regional plan would not require a completely
new planning effort because much of the background information
already exists in individual local government comprehensive plans
and regional and state regulatory agencies. The combined resources
of local governments and pertinent agencies working in a concerted
fashion would enable the resource to be better protected. Individual
regulatory entities in the Green Swamp often lack the economic
resources and technical expertise to adequately consider and protect
the natural resources of the Green Swamp. A regional authority with
funding from local, regional, state, and federal entities would have
much greater economic and technical capability than existing entities
acting unilaterally.
A regional plan and authority have potential disadvantages for
local governments. First, there would be some loss of local
government planning autonomy. While local governments would
retain initial development review authority and gain final
development review authority, they would lose some planning
authority because they would be bound by the regional
comprehensive plan. However, there would be local government
representation in the development of the regional plan.
The regional plan and authority approach is unlikely to work
unless it is mandatory. In addition, a regional plan and authority
approach is only as good as the content of the comprehensive plan
and the manner in which it is implemented. Therefore, significant
state direction and oversight are critical in the early stages of the
process. Once the mechanism is in place, only periodic state review
should be necessary.

266. FLA. STAT. ch. 380.05(12) (1997).
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2. Riparian Buffers to Protect Wildlife Habitat
Florida has developed several river protection programs to protect
biodiversity and employ ecosystem management principles. This
Part discusses protection of the ecosystems surrounding the Wekiva,
Econlockhatchee, and Tomoka Rivers, which are depicted in Figure
C below. These regulatory programs use wildlife home range needs
as the basis for establishing riparian habitat protection zones, within
which most development is prohibited. Analysis of these regulatory
efforts identifies some of the problems and potential solutions for
protecting biodiversity.
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Figure C: Florida Rivers With Riparian Habitat Protection Zones
a. Wekiva River
The Wekiva River is a small pristine inland river located
precariously close to the Orlando metropolitan area. In 1988, due to
public concern that the Wekiva River was threatened by rapid
development, then Governor Bob Martinez commissioned the
Wekiva River Task Force, composed largely of agency heads, to
study the Wekiva watershed and to make recommendations for its
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The Task Force's report proposed sweeping
protection.267
recommendations, including legislative directives that the St. Johns
River Water Management District ("SJRWMD") adopt protection
zones along the river for water quality, water quantity, and riparian
habitat, and that local governments amend their comprehensive plans
to provide for protection of the Wekiva Watershed. 68 The
Legislature responded quickly and passed the legislation
recommended by the Task Force. 269 The Wekiva legislation is
unique because it requires the water management district and local
governments to take specific and concrete action to protect riparian
wildlife and other ecosystem attributes within the Wekiva Basin.27 °
1. Water Management District Buffer Zones
In 1988, the legislature amended the water management district's
organic statute, requiring the SJRWMD to adopt rules establishing
"'
protection zones along watercourses in the Wekiva River System.27
267. Fla. Exec. Order No. 88-26 (Feb. 4, 1988) (issued by the
office of the governor of the state of Florida).
268. WEKIVA RIVER TASK FORCE, REPORT TO GOVERNOR BOB
MARTINEZ v-ix (1988).
269. FLA. STAT. ch. 373.415 (requiring the SJRWMD to adopt
protection zones); Id. at ch. 369.301 (requiring local governments to
protect the river).
270. See generally Naomi Smith Whitney & Jeffery C. Elledge,
Effective Environmental Action: The Case of the Wekiva River, in
WATER: LAWS AND MANAGEMENT 9B-13 (1989) (proceedings of a
Conference Sponsored by the American Water Resources
Association (Sept. 17-22, 1989)); Glenn Lowe & Carl Salafrio, The
Evolution of Wetland Regulation Under Chapter 40C-4, F.A.C., in
WETLANDS: CONCERNS AND SUCCESSES 557 (1989); MARK T.
BROWN & JOSEPH M. SCHAEFER, ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MGMT.

DIST., BUFFER ZONES FOR WATER, WETLANDS AND WILDLIFE (1987)
(proceedings of a Conference Sponsored by the American Water
Resources Association (Sept. 17-22, 1989) and describing rationale
and methodology to determine riparian habitat protection zones);
Schaefer & Brown, supra, note 34 (describing process to determine
and adopt riparian habitat protection zones).
271. Act of June 6, 1988, 1988 Fla. Laws chs. 88-121.2, 88-393.27
(codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 373.415 (1997)). In addition, the District
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The protection zones must be wide enough to "prevent harm to the
Wekiva River System, including water quality, water quantity,
hydrology, wetlands, and aquatic and wetland-dependent wildlife
species." '
The Water Management District must consider the
following factors when determining the widths of the protection
zones:
(a) The biological significance of the wetlands and uplands
adjacent to the designated watercourses . ..including the
nesting, feeding, breeding, and resting needs of aquatic
species and wetland-dependent wildlife species.
(b) The sensitivity of these species to disturbance, including
the short-term and long-term adaptability to disturbance of
the more sensitive species, both migratory and resident.
(c) The susceptibility of these lands to erosion, including the
slope, soils, runoff characteristics, and vegetative cover.273
Residential development, land clearing, and other activities within
the Wekiva River Hydrologic Basin are required to satisfy standards
addressing water quantity (including recharge, 74 storage,275 and

must obtain the appropriate local government's certification that a
proposed activity is consistent with the local comprehensive plan
and is in compliance with land development regulations prior to
issuing a District permit. Id. at ch. 373.415(2). The District must
also develop a groundwater basin resource availability inventory for
the Wekiva River Protection Area, and must establish minimum
flows and minimum water levels for surface waters in the Wekiva
River System and minimum groundwater levels within the Wekiva
Basin. Id. at ch. 373.415(3).
272. Id. at ch. 373.415(1).
273. Id. at chs. 373.415(1)(a)-(c).
274. Recharge Standard: Projects located in Most Effective
Recharge Areas must retain within the project three inches of runoff
from all directly connected impervious areas, or show that post
development recharge capacity is equivalent or greater than predevelopment recharge capacity. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40C41.063(3)(a) (1995).
275. Storage Standard: Surface water management systems are
prohibited from causing' a net reduction in flood storage within
certain 100 year flood plains within the Basin. Id. at r. 40C41.063(3)(b).
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drawdowns 27 6 ), water quality, 27 7 and riparian wildlife habitat. 278 The

SJRWMD implemented these standards by establishing three
protection zones: the Water Quality Protection Zone,279 the Water
Quantity Protection Zone, 280 and the Riparian Habitat Protection
Zone. 2 ' Each of these zones contributes to conserving biodiversity
in the Wekiva ecosystem because collectively they restrict
development activities that degrade ecosystem functions, including
land clearing, construction of dwellings and other buildings, and
alteration of surface water flows.

276. Id. at r. 40C-41.063(3)(d).
277. Id. at r. 40C-41.063(3)(c).
278. Id. at r. 40C-41.063(3)(e).
279. The Water Quality Protection Zone extends one half mile
from the Wekiva River and many of its tributaries, and also extends
one quarter mile from any wetland abutting an Outstanding Florida
Water. Id. at r. 40C-41.063(3)(c). Applicants for surface water
management permits must submit an erosion and sediment control
plan as part of their permit application. Id. at r. 40C-41.063(3)(c)2.
The erosion and sediment control plan must provide "reasonable
assurance . . . that during construction or alteration of the system
(including revegetation and stabilization), erosion will be minimized
and sediment will be retained on-site." Id. at r. 40C-41.063(2); see
In re Floyd R. Womack, 1992 Fla. ENV LEXIS 195 (Fla. St. Johns
River Water Mgmt. Dist. Nov. 10, 1992) (denying landowner's
application to construct three single-family residences within the
Water Quality Protection Zone in part because landowner failed to
provide an erosion and sediment control plan).
280. The Water Quantity Protection Zone extends 300 feet
landward from wetlands which abut the Wekiva River and many of
its tributaries. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40C-41.063(3)(d) (1995).
When any part of a surface water management system is located
within the zone, the applicant must provide "reasonable assurance
that . . . the system will not cause ground water table drawdowns
which would adversely affect the functions provided to aquatic and
wetlands dependent species . . . by the referenced wetlands." Id.
The District presumes the drawdown standard is satisfied if a surface
water management system will not cause a ground water table
drawdown within the Water Quantity Protection Zone. Id.
281. Id. at r. 40C-41.063(3)(e).
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The key regulatory provision protecting biodiversity is the
Riparian Habitat Protection Zone, which includes 1) wetlands
abutting the river and its tributaries, 2) uplands within fifty feet of
abutting wetlands, and 3) uplands which are within 550 feet of the
282
river's edge.

Riparian Habitat Protection Zone
-' 550 Feet
,,0Feet
Wetland

Wd

Figure D: Wekiva River Riparian Habitat Protection Zone
Within the Riparian Habitat Protection Zone, the District presumes
that construction of buildings, golf courses, impoundments, roads,
canals, ditches, swales, and any land clearing resulting in the
creation of any surface water management system violate the
Riparian Wildlife Habitat standard.283 An applicant seeking a surface
water management permit must provide "reasonable assurance that
282. Id. r. 40C-41.063(3)(e)1. The buffer width is based on studies
conducted by the University of Florida's Center for Wetlands. See
BROWN & SCHAEFER, supra note 270; Schaefer & Brown, supra
note 34.
283. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40C-41.063(3)(e)2. The rule does

not presume that activities not listed have no adverse effect. Id. The
presumption does not apply to activities that promote a more
endemic state on land that has already been changed by man. Id. at
r. 40C-41.063(3)(e)3.
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the construction or alteration of a system will not adversely affect
the abundance, food sources, or habitat (including its use to satisfy
nesting, breeding and resting needs) of aquatic or wetland dependent
species provided by the [zone]." '84
The rebuttable presumption established in the SJRWMD rule has
the effect of severely restricting most, but not all, forms of
development within the Riparian Habitat Protection Zone.
Predictably, several landowners have contested the District's
application of the rules and the validity of the rules and statute. In re
Floyd R. Womack Womack Subdivision MSSW Application involved
a District denial of a landowner's request to construct three singlefamily residences within the zone in part because the applicant failed
to provide reasonable assurance the construction would not cause
adverse effects to fish and wildlife, including aquatic and wetland
species. 85 The property consisted of three acres of forested uplands
and four acres of forested wetlands located within the zone, and sixtenths of an acre located outside the zone." 6 The applicant proposed
clearing at least nine-tenths of an acre within the zone. The District
determined construction of the three residences would destroy
valuable habitat and diminish effectiveness of the zone as a wildlife
corridor. The District proposed several alternatives to mitigate the
adverse effects, including relocating the project outside the zone or
reducing the developed acreage and relocating the project within the
zone.87 The applicant rejected both of these proposals and declined
to offer any mitigation. 88 The District then issued a final order
denying the application. The applicant has filed suit in circuit court,
alleging inverse condemnation, among other claims, but the case was
not resolved at the time of this writing. 89
284. Id. at r. 40C-41.063(3)(e)1.
285. In re Floyd R. Womack, 1992 Fla. ENV LEXIS 195 (Fla. St.
Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. Nov. 10, 1992).
286 Womack, 1992 Fla. ENV LEXIS, at *2-*3.
287. Id. at *4-*5.
288. Id.
289. The landowner alleged denial of substantive due process,
inverse condemnation, temporary taking, inverse condemnation,
permanent taking, violation of equal protection rights,
unconstitutional interference with constitutional privacy rights, and
requested a declaration that the Wekiva rules and statute are
unconstitutional. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, Womack v.
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In another case interpreting the riparian habitat protection zone, a
private property owner applied for a permit to construct a single
family residence on a 0.72 acre lot located within the zone."' ° The
District issued a permit allowing destruction of 0.3 acres of forested
uplands, subject to a condition that the owners dedicate a
conservation easement to the District prohibiting all construction
including clearing, dredging, or filling not authorized in the
permit.29 ' Citizen groups subsequently filed a petition for a formal
hearing, objecting to a provision in the permit allowing for "limited
vegetation removal of trees less than 4 inches in diameter and of
under brush, to be agreed upon by District staff and permittee. ' ' 92 A
hearing officer determined the permit would violate the riparian
habitat protection standard unless the District removed the provision
allowing limited removal of vegetation. 93
The landowner then filed suit in circuit court alleging inverse
condemnation. 94 The court found for the District, holding the
plaintiff had failed to establish they had been deprived of
substantially all reasonable economic use of the property, or suffered
a physical intrusion due to continuing occupation by animals and
plants native to the area.2 95 The decision was affirmed by a Florida

District Court of Appeal.296
St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. (Seminole County Ct. filed Sept.
28, 1994) (No. 92-3044-CA-14K). The case remained unresolved
and a trial date had not been set at the time this article was
published.
Telephone Interview with William H. Congdon,
Attorney, Office of General Counsel, St. Johns River Water
Management District (Dec. 14, 2001).
290. Friends of the Wekiva & Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Jim Saboff,
No. 91-6823, 1992 Fla. ENV LEXIS 132 (St. Johns River Water
Mgmt. Dist. Aug. 4, 1992).
291. Wekiva, 1992 Fla. ENV LEXIS, at *2, *14-*15.
292. Id. at *17.
293. Id. at *31-*34.
294. Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, Saboff v. St. Johns
River Water Mgmt. Dist. (Seminole County Ct. filed Apr. 4, 1994)
(No. 91-2970-CA- 16L).
295. Order Dismissing Counts II, III, IV & V of Second Amended
Complaint, Striking paragraph 54 and 56 of Count III and Granting
Plaintiffs Leave to Amend Count I of the Second Amended
Complaint, Saboff v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. (Seminole
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The landowner subsequently filed suit in federal district
court, alleging the District had taken his property and violated his
equal protection and substantive due process rights.297 In Saboff v.
Saint Johns River Water Management District,Judge Sharp held for
the plaintiff, finding that the conservation easement frustrated a
portion of the plaintiffs reasonable investment-backed expectations
because it burdened the property in a way not bargained for by the
plaintiff.298 The court ordered the District to pay the Saboff's
$188,333.07 to compensate for property value, violation of
substantive due process rights, and interest. 99 Judge Sharp based
this finding on a flawed interpretation of Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission."
Judge Sharp correctly cited Nollan as
authority that a permit condition that effectuates acquisition of title
or interferes with possessory rights may be a taking of private
property, but failed to examine whether there was a nexus between
the purpose of the riparian protection regulations and the
conservation easement. The Saboff case is easily distinguished from
Nollan because the purpose of conservation easement was to
conserve native vegetation in the riparian habitat protection zone,
which is the identical purpose for which the District established the
protection zones.'O Clearly, there is an extremely close nexus
between the purposes of the Saboff permit condition and the riparian
County Ct. filed Dec. 14, 1993) (No. 91-2970-CA-16-K); Order on
Plaintiffs' Motion for Rehearing, Saboff v. St. Johns River Water
Mgmt. Dist. (Seminole County Ct. filed Feb. 28, 1994) (No. 912970-CA-16-K).
296. Saboff v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 681 So. 2d 757
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
297. Saboff v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 96-1223CIV-ORL-18, 1 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 1996), rev'd, 200 F.3d 1356
(2000).
298. Saboff, at 4 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 1996).
299. Id. at 6-7.
300. 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (in which the Supreme Court found that
a building permit condition requiring landowners to dedicate an
easement for public beach access was a taking because there was an
insufficient nexus between the permit condition and the purpose of
the government regulation).
301. See FLA. STAT. ch. 373.415(1) (1997); FLA. ADMi. CODE
ANN. r. 40C-41.063(3)(e) (1995).
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zones, whereas in Nollan there was no apparent nexus at all. On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court declined to review Judge Sharp's
reasoning regarding takings, finding instead that landowner's federal
takings claims were barred by Florida principles of res judicata.0 2
The practical effect of this decision is to reinstate the Florida District
Court of Appeal decision that there was no taking of private
property. Nonetheless, the Saboff case illustrates the potential for
clashes between landowners and government regulatory programs to
protect biodiversity.
2. Local Government Buffer Zones
In 1988, the Florida legislature also enacted the Wekiva River
Protection Act" 3 ("Act"), which directed counties with jurisdiction
in the Wekiva River Protection Area ("Wekiva Area") 4 to revise
their comprehensive plans and land development regulations to
protect the Wekiva Area.30 5 Specifically, the counties must adopt
goals, policies, and objectives for the Wekiva Area which will
protect water quantity, water quality, hydrology, wetlands, aquatic
and wetland-dependent wildlife species, habitat of listed species, and
native vegetation.3"6 County plans and regulations for the Wekiva
River Protection Area are subject to review and approval by the
Department of Community Affairs and the Governor and Cabinet.30 7
County plans must provide for land uses, and densities and
intensities of development which will protect the resources and rural
character of the Wekiva Area.30 ' The county comprehensive plans

302. Saboff v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 200 F.3d
(1 th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 67 (2000).
303. 1988 Fla. Laws chs. 88-121.1, 88-393.26, (codified at
STAT. chs. 369.301-369.313 (1997)).
304. The Wekiva River Protection Area is larger than the
regulated by the Water Management District protection zones.
STAT. ch. 369.303(9).
305. Id. at ch. 369.305(1).
306. Id. at ch. 369.305(1)(a).
307. Id. at chs. 369.305(2)-(6); see also supra notes 131-42.
308. County comprehensive plans must include:
1. Provisions to ensure the preservation of sufficient
habitat for feeding, nesting, roosting, and resting so as to

1356
FLA.
area
FLA.
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must require that development which is permitted on property
adjacent to the Wekiva River System be concentrated on portions of
the property furthest away from surface waters and wetlands of the
river system." 9 Counties must also develop land development
regulations to implement the Wekiva River protection provisions of
their comprehensive plans. I
The three affected counties, Orange, Seminole, and Lake,
responded quickly and adopted provisions required by the Wekiva
legislation."' Their plans and regulations were reviewed by DCA

maintain viable populations of species designated ... [as
endangered, threatened, or of special concern].
2. Restrictions on the clearing of native vegetation within
the 100-year flood plain.
3. Prohibition of development that is not low-density
residential in nature, unless that development has less
impacts on natural resources than low-density residential
development.
4. Provisions for setbacks along the Wekiva River for
areas that do not fall within the protection zones
established pursuant to [Water Management District
protection zones for the Wekiva River Protection Area].
5. Restrictions on intensity of development adjacent to
publicly owned lands to prevent adverse impacts to such
lands.
6. Restrictions on filling and alteration of wetlands in the
Wekiva River Protection Area.
7.
Provisions encouraging clustering of residential
development
when it promotes protection
of
environmentally sensitive areas, and ensuring that
residential development in the aggregate shall be of a
rural density and character.
Id. at ch. 369.305(1)(b).
309. FLA. STAT. ch. 369.305(1)(c).
310. Id. at ch. 369.305(1)(e).
311. Orange County, Fla., Ordinance 88-6 (Apr. 18, 1988);
SEMINOLE COUNTY, FLA., AMENDMENTS TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE
SEMINOLE COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN (Feb. 28, 1989)
[hereinafterSEMINOLE COUNTY AMENDMENTS]; Lake County, Fla.,
Ordinance 1990-91 (Mar. 6, 1990).
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and approved by the Governor and Cabinet." 2 The Orange and
Seminole County approaches are similar, with Orange County
prohibiting development within 550 feet of the River,31 3 and
Seminole County enforcing all water management district clearing
and building setbacks and establishing a minimum 200-foot clearing
and building setback measured from the ordinary high water
elevation or the landward limit of wetlands." 4 Both counties
encourage clustering of development outside the protected zone,31 5
include policy statements pledging to maintain the "rural character"
of the area,3 16 and designate zoning densities for the Area.3 17

Lake County also adopted provisions to conform with the
SJRWMVID protection zones.318 However, Lake County went further
than the other counties, adopting several innovative mechanisms
including a Transferrable Development Rights ("TDRs") program 3 9
312. Telephone Interview with Jim Farr, Department of
Community Affairs (Jan. 1990); see supra note 137.
313. Orange County Ordinance, supra note 311. Orange County
prohibits development within a buffer zone 550 feet landward from
the edge of waters or the landward edge of connected wetlands,
whichever is greater, unless the activity can be shown to "pose no
significant threat to water quality, water quantity, or wildlife habitat
for wetland dependent species." Id.
314. SEMINOLE COUNTY AMENDMENTS, supra note 311, at 38-49.
315. Orange County Ordinance, supra note 311; SEMINOLE
COUNTY AMENDMENTS, supra note 311, at 46-47.
316. Orange County Ordinance, supra note 311; SEMINOLE
COUNTY AMENDMENTS, supra note 311, at 42, 47.
317. Orange County Ordinance, supra note 311 (limiting density in
the rural service area to one dwelling per five acres); SEMINOLE
CouNTY AMENDMENTS, supra note 311, at 42-45 (limiting density
in areas designated rural to one dwelling per acre, but adopting
policy that no development will be approved, regardless of zoning
classification, unless the development conforms with the Wekiva
Act).
318. Lake County Ordinance, supra note at 311, 312, 331.
319. The amendments create a TDR system where Districts 1 and 2
are designated as ','sending areas." Id. at 11-13. Owners of land
within the sending areas may sell their development rights to owners
of land within designated receiving areas. The amendments create
two receiving areas where Lake County wants to direct development
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and a Development Points Rating System,3 20 to encourage protection
of sensitive lands while providing property owners with options for
use of their land. The Lake County amendments establish two
overlay protection zones which limit density21and intensity of land
use within the Wekiva River Protection Area.1
activities. Id. at 13-17. Land owners within the receiving areas who
purchase development rights may then increase the density of
development on their lands. Lake County staff indicate the TDR
program has been used infrequently. Telephone Interview with Jeff
Richardson, Principal Planner, Lake County Planning Department,
Lake County, Fla. (July 9, 1997). The TDR program was last used
in 1991. Lake County Ordinance, supra note 311, at 3-17.
320. The Development Point Rating System assigns numerical
values to various rating criteria. The objectives of these criteria are
to "ensure environmental protection; control urban sprawl; maximize
land use efficiency; promote the efficient use of public facilities;
ensure that services required by development are in place or are
programmed concurrent with development impacts; and to direct
appropriate growth patterns within the Wekiva River Protection
Area." Lake County Ordinance supra note 311, at 17. The
amendments establish ranges of scores which correspond to the
amount of density increase which will be allowed. Id. Although the
point system establishes guidelines for determining whether
increases in density should be granted, the amendments state
explicitly that the achievement of points will not prohibit the county
from allowing an increase in density. Id. This provision weakens
the point system by allowing the county to deviate from the
underlying density of one unit per 40 acres.
321. District 1 corresponds with the farthest boundary established
by the Water Management District's Wekiva River Hydrologic
Basin Protection Zones and limits maximum density to one dwelling
unit per forty net acres. Lake County Ordinance, supra note 311.
Net acres is defined as the total acreage of the parcel minus 1)
wetlands defined by the Water Management District or Lake County,
2) lands within the Water Management District's Wekiva River
Riparian Habitat Protection Zone, 3) lands within the 100 year flood
plain, and 4) road right of ways and easements for ingress and
egress. Id. at 5. Alternatively, density may be increased to one
dwelling unit per 10 net acres through successful application of the
Development Point Rating System. Id. at 12. District 2 includes
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3. Analysis of the Wekiva Program
The Wekiva approach has several strengths. Authorizing the St.
Johns River Water Management District, a regional agency, to adopt
special regulations for the Wekiva Basin increases the likelihood that
enumerated values will receive consistent consideration throughout
the entire Basin. The use of protection zones of constant width by
the Water Management District ensures that District permitting
criteria will be applied consistently throughout the Wekiva Basin,
simplifies administration because it eliminates the need to map the
entire basin, and provides applicants with easily determined zones
with consistent boundaries. Further, the width of the protection zone
is based on scientific findings.
The legislation unambiguously directs the Water Management
District to establish protection zones and regulations to protect
wetland and wetland dependent wildlife and other important habitat
values, such as hydrology and water quantity." 2 The Act removes
any uncertainty as to the District's authority to regulate riparian
habitat for the benefit of wetland and wetland dependent wildlife.
Although this authority can be implied from general language in
Chapter 373,323 the governing board of the District had previously

declined to regulate riparian habitat without additional legislative
direction. The Act made it clear that the Water Management District
was authorized, and in fact directed, to regulate riparian habitat,
including riparian uplands, for the benefit of wetland and wetlanddependent wildlife in the Wekiva Basin.3" 4

The legislation requires local governments within the Wekiva
River Protection Area to plan and regulate to protect the Wekiva
System.325 Legislative enumeration of specific values and concerns
which local governments must address ensures comprehensive and
most of the remaining lands within the Wekiva River Protection
Area and limits maximum density to one dwelling unit per 20 net
acres. Density may be increased to one dwelling unit per five net
acres through successful application of the Development Point
Rating System. Id. at 13.
322. See FLA. STAT. ch. 373.415 (1997).
323. Chapter 373 authorizes the water management districts to
regulate "water resources." Id. at ch. 373.413.
324. Id. at chs. 415(1)(a)-(c).
325. Id. at chs. 369.301-.313.
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consistent regulation of the Wekiva River Protection Area. Local
governments are well-suited to participate in regulation of river
systems because they routinely review all forms of development
proposals and can use existing development review mechanisms to
implement new regulations.
The Wekiva River Protection Act approach also has some
weaknesses. The legislation puts significant responsibility on local
governments that may not have the money, resources, or inclination
to effectively protect the river system. Local governments, charged
with addressing the multiple and often conflicting needs of the
electorate, may not be the best entities to make decisions regarding
protection of limited and unique environmental systems such as
rivers.
Individual local government plans and regulations may not result
in a comprehensive and uniform protection of the resource. For
example, legislative requirements that local governments in the
Wekiva River Protection Area adopt setbacks from the river has
resulted in Lake and Seminole counties adopting setbacks of 200 feet
from the river, while Orange county has adopted a much wider
setback of 500 feet from the landward edge of the river or connected
wetlands. Similarly, Seminole County limits density on much of the
land within the Wekiva River Protection Area to a maximum of 1
dwelling unit per acre, Orange County to 1 dwelling unit per 5 acres,
and Lake County to 1 dwelling unit per 20 or 40 net acres.
Local governments need considerable time to develop and
implement individual comprehensive plans and regulations. For
example, Seminole and Orange Counties were able to develop plans
and regulations relatively quickly, largely because they already had
some provisions in their comprehensive plans and regulations that
helped satisfy the requirements of the Act. However, it took Lake
County about one and one half years to adopt regulations for the
Wekiva Basin, at which time the county permitted significant
amounts of development.
The rapid enactment of protection mechanisms is critical to the
preservation of natural systems where many new large scale
developments are proposed. Significant acreages of sensitive and
irreplaceable habitat may be lost during the time it takes to develop
new land development regulations and agency rules. Governmental
entities could greatly reduce the amount of unsuitable development
by adopting interim regulations until new land development
regulations and rules are developed.
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The Wekiva legislation requires the Water Management District
and local governments to protect aquatic and wetland dependent
species, and habitat of endangered, threatened, or special concern
species. However, the legislation fails to require protection of
upland species of wildlife within the Wekiva Basin. While low
density requirements may help preserve some upland habitat, there
are no assurances that adequate upland habitat will be preserved in
the future.
The Wekiva approach could be improved by providing more
specificity in the enabling legislation, such as establishing a
minimum buffer width which all local governments must adopt,
defining what constitutes "rural character," and providing the Water
Management Districts with authority to consider all species of
wildlife when reviewing environmental resource permit applications.
In addition, a legislative directive requiring regulatory entities to
adopt interim regulations would prevent adverse development while
the entities are developing permanent regulations for a system.
b. EconlockhatcheeRiver
In 1989, shortly after adopting the Wekiva River protection
program, the St. Johns River Water Management District began
developing a similar plan for the Econlockhatchee ("Econ") River.326
While the Econ program involved Wekiva-like riparian buffer zones,
the program differed in several respects. First, the District used a
deliberate and open process that facilitated acceptance and adoption
of policies and regulations to protect the Econ River Basin. Second,
unlike the Wekiva program, the District had no explicit statutory
326. See ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT,
ECONLOCKHATCHEE
RIVER
BASIN
DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION PLAN
RIVER PLAN]. Like the Wekiva River,

NATURAL

RESOURCES

(1990) [hereinafter ECON
the area surrounding the
Econlockhatchee (Econ) River was one of the most rapidly growing
areas in the nation and was under intense development pressure. At
least 40 major residential developments involving over 34,000 acres
had recently been approved within the Econ Basin. Tucker &
Hamann, supra note 148, at 89-93, 96-99. Many proposed
developments straddled or were adjacent to the Big Econ River,
which was relatively undeveloped. The potential environmental
degradation from these projects was substantial. Id.
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authority for riparian buffer zones, and instead relied upon its
general authority to regulate "water resources.""32 Third, therp was
no legislative directive requiring local governments to protect the
Econ River, yet local governments adopted ordinances establishing
buffer zones for the river. 28 The remainder of this Part examines
these aspects of the Econ River program in greater detail.
1. Process
The process the District followed when developing the Econ River
program warrants discussion because it yielded a comprehensive
management program spanning several jurisdictions that included
clear substantive standards to protect biodiversity, despite the
absence of a common legislative directive to adopt the program.
When the District began considering a protection program for the
Econ River, the scientific data and rationale for delineating riparian
habitat protection zones in Central Florida already existed in the
form of the Wekiva model3 29 and scientific studies.33° The District
could have proceeded with rulemaking, but instead initiated a policy
development process involving citizens, government, and
development interests. The District contracted with consultants'
charged with developing a management plan to protect water quality
and quantity, ecological functions, and wildlife resources of the
Econlockhatchee System through management, regulation, and land
acquisition.3 2 In addition to the consultants, the District appointed
the Econ River Task Force, a committee with representatives from
diverse interest groups.333 The District then hosted a series of public
327. See FLA. STAT. ch. 373.413.

328. See infra notes 358-60 and accompanying text.
329. See supra Part IV.D.2.a (describing the Wekiva River
program).
330. See BROWN & SCHAEFER, supra note 270.

331. The consultants included a wildlife ecologist, a wetlands
ecologist, and several legal analysts from the University of Florida,
and experts in archaeological resources from a private consulting
firm.
332. See generally ECON RIVER PLAN, supra note 326.
333. The Task Force included representatives from development
corporations, environmental consultants, home-builders and real
estate associations, environmental groups, and local, regional, and
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meetings over the course of about a year and a half, in which it deemphasized its customary role of regulator and instead served
primarily as a facilitator for the Task Force, consultants, and citizens
to develop a protection program.
During the course of the public meetings the consultants routinely
presented their findings and recommendations to the members of the
Task Force.334 Composed of a variety of interest groups, many
members of the Task Force were initially resistant to the consultant's
recommendations. However, through the course of the regular
public meetings, most members changed their attitudes to one of
mutual cooperation and ultimately the Task Force endorsed most of
The District and local
the consultant's recommendations.335
governments then responded by developing new regulations and
ordinances to protect the Econ River.
While it is impossible to predict with certainty whether this
process would work as well in other settings, there are several
First, the Wekiva
elements that contributed to its success.
experience raised awareness regarding river protection and the
importance of riparian habitat, and provided a scientific basis for
delineating buffers. Thus, the Wekiva served as a useful model for
many of the participants who developed the Econ River program.
The Florida Legislature's directive to create riparian protection zones
to protect wildlife in the Wekiva Basin336 undoubtedly enhanced the
legitimacy of using this approach to protect riparian wildlife habitat
in other river systems. Second, the regular public meetings served to
state government. See generally ECON RIVER PLAN, supra note 326;
Joseph M. Schaefer et al., A Natural Resources Management and
Protection Planfor the Econlockhatchee River Basin, in I WILDLIFE
CONSERVATION IN METROPOLITAN ENVIRONMENTS

147-48 (1991);

BROWN & SCHAEFER, supra note 270 (describing rationale and
methodology to determine riparian habitat protection zones);
Schaefer & Brown, supra note 34 (describing a process to determine
and adopt riparian habitat protection zones).
334. The consultants were not controlled by the Task Force, and
both entities presented separate reports to the water management
District.
335. Ultimately, the consultants presented the District with a final
report, and the Task Force issued its own recommendations, most of
which endorsed key recommendations of the consultants.
336. See FLA. STAT. ch. 373.415(1).
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educate persons developing policy for the Econ. This was an
important factor because some Task Force members who were
initially resistant to proposed regulations changed their minds after
they fully understood the threats to the system and the scientific
rationale for the riparian protection zones. Third, involving interest
groups early in the process and providing them with substantial
opportunities to ask questions, voice their concerns, and present
alternative proposals created an atmosphere of cooperation rather
than confrontation. Finally, pervasive development during the past
30 years in the Orlando area likely contributed to a heightened
awareness among many citizens and government of the need to
conserve remaining natural areas. The confluence of these factors
facilitated development of the Econ program.
2. Key Recommendations
of the Econ Consultants and Task Force
Like the Wekiva River, residential and commercial development
threatened the ecological integrity and wildlife habitat values of the
Econ River.337 Existing local, regional, state, and federal regulatory
programs did not adequately protect the natural resources values of

337. With respect to wildlife, the report found that many habitats
within the Basin had already been severely fragmented by land uses
and highways. Schaefer, supra note 13, at 3-45. Much of the
remaining relatively undisturbed habitat was along the Big Econ.
The Basin provided habitat for 22 species that were endangered,
threatened, or of special concern. Id. at 3-2. Further, about 35
species in the Econlockhatchee Basin occur almost exclusively in
aquatic and wetland habitats, and 119 species usually require access
to both wetlands and uplands. Id. at 3-41. Land uses in the area had
severed historic linkages between the Econ Basin and large areas of
flatwoods to the east and sandhills to the west. Id. at 3-3.
Conversion of native lands into pasture had benefited common opencanopy species, such as brown-headed cowbirds and red-tailed
hawks that parasitize and compete with remaining forest dependent
species. Schaefer, supra note 333, at 148. Development also had
resulted in predation from dogs and cats, and unnatural noises which
exert additional pressures on native wildlife. Id.
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the Econ Basin because they did not provide for protection of upland
habitat.338
The consultants and Task Force339 recommended that the District
amend its surface water management regulations to establish 550foot buffers along each side of the river to protect water quality and
aquatic and wetland-dependent species, limit groundwater
drawdowns, strengthen stormwater permitting criteria, and provide
for upland buffers adjacent to isolated wetlands. 4 In addition, the
consultants and Task Force recommended that local governments
implement additional protection measures including an additional
550-foot buffer to protect upland species.'
3. Statutory Authority for
WMD Riparian Habitat Protection Zones
The WMD relied upon its general statutory authority to regulate
"water resources" when developing the Econ riparian habitat
338. Tucker & Hamann, supra note 148, at 1. The water
management district also allowed destruction of small isolated
wetlands. Id. at 77-78. The regulations did not adequately protect
water quality and quantity and allowed harmful groundwater
drawdowns which could reduce the base flow of the river system.
Id. at 76-82. Stormwater regulations permitted inadequate treatment
systems and depended on a nutrient standard that was difficult to
enforce. Id. at 82-83. The nutrient standard stated "in no case shall
nutrient concentrations of a body of water be altered so as to cause
an imbalance in natural populations of aquatic flora and fauna."
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 17-3.121(19) (1987). This standard
failed to consider the effects other factors, such as temperature, light,
and the rate of water movement, may have on populations of flora
and fauna. Tucker & Hamann, supra note 148, at 83.
339. The District developed the Econ program based on
recommendations of consultants and a Task Force. See supra notes
329-36 and accompanying text (explaining the role of the
consultants and Task Force).
340. Tucker & Hamann, supra note 148, at 7-10, 17-20.
341. Id. at 6-7, 10, 18-20. The primary rationale for the second
550 foot buffer is to buffer the first buffer from edge effects that
might degrade its wildlife habitat value, such as light penetration,
noise, runoff, and predation from dogs and cats.
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protection zones because there was no explicit legislative
authorization for the zones.342 The Legislature did not define "water
resources" and thus a key legal question concerned whether "water
resources" includes wildlife, and if so, what kinds of wildlife. At the
time the WMD developed the Econ program there were no judicial
decisions interpreting the relationship of "water resources" to
wildlife, although the SJR WMD had clearly articulated its
interpretation in a 1986 final order, Friends of Fort George, Inc. v.
FairfieldCommunities, Inc.343
Friends of Fort George concerned a request by a Georgia-based
development company to construct about 1,343 residential units,
80,000 square feet of commercial area, and several golf courses on
900 acre Fort George Island, located northeast of Jacksonville,
Florida."' The WMD approved the company's application for
conceptual approval of a surface water management permit, and
several citizen's groups subsequently challenged the permit.345 In a
recommended order upholding the District's permit approval, an
administrative hearing officer included findings of fact and
conclusions of law establishing that the proposed development
would have no adverse affects on "wildlife," "plant life," and
'
"terrestrial species."346
The District rejected this language because
the hearing officer's words implied that the District's authority to
regulate water resources included upland wildlife. The District
disagreed with this interpretation and issued a final order which
deleted all references to "wildlife" and replaced them with "aquatic
and wetland dependent wildlife," because "the scope of inquiry
under [the WMID surface water permitting program] does not extend
'
to wildlife species which are not aquatic or wetland dependent."347
.342. See FLA. STAT. ch. 373.413 (1997).
343. ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MGMT. DIST., FINAL ORDER (Dec. 9,
1986) (Nos. 85-3537, 85-3596).
344. Tucker & Hamann, supra note 148, at 41-43. Existing land
use on the island at the time of the proposal included about 16
homes, one golf course with clubhouse, a state park, and a bird and
plant sanctuary. Id. at 41.
345. Id. at 37-38.
346. Id. at 55-61, 84-87.
347. Id. at 26-3 1. The district governing board based this
conclusion on District staff testimony asserting that past agency
practice included consideration of affects on aquatic and wetland
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The recommended and final orders contain no references to
allegations that the District had either shirked its responsibilities or
exceeded its authority relative to wildlife. Thus, it is unclear
whether the District was responding to allegations raised by the
parties, was concerned that the issue would be raised on appeal, or
was making an unsolicited proclamation to remove any future
ambiguity concerning its view of WMD authority to regulate
wildlife. Regardless of the District's motivation, the Friends of Fort
George decision is often referenced as authority for WMIDs to
regulate aquatic and wetland dependent species, but not upland
species, and the District relied upon this interpretation when
developing the Econ riparian zones.348 Paradoxically, the Friends of
Fort George decision precludes district regulation of uplands for the
benefit of upland species, yet impliedly validates district regulation
of uplands for the benefit of aquatic and wetland dependent species.
In the spring of 1990 a bill was introduced in the Florida
Legislature that directed the District, other agencies, and local
governments to adopt measures to implement many of the Econ
consultant's recommendations.349 At the direction of its governing
board, the District began preliminary rulemaking. Although the bill
died in committee hearings,35 the District continued rule
development for the Econlockhatchee River.
Despite strong
developer opposition,"' the District ultimately adopted a rule
establishing a 550-foot protection zone and development standards
and review criteria similar to those adopted for the Wekiva River.352
dependent species, but not other species, and that the District's
regulations reflected this intent. Id. at 28.
348. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40C-4.301 (1995)
(referencing Friends of Fort George as authority that the scope of
inquiry does not extend to species which are not aquatic or wetland
dependent).
349. S.B. 1852, 1990 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1990); H.B. 1673,
1990 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1990).
350. See Lawrence J. Lebowitz, Heavy Lobbying Leads House to
Scrap Econ Plan, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 14, 1992, at D5.
351. See, e.g., Mary Beth Regan, Activists Win Battle for Econ but
Developers Vow to Fight Protection, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 4,
1992, at BI.
352. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40C-4.041(2)(b)3, 6 (establishing
permitting thresholds for the Econlockhatchee Basin); Id. r. 40C-
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Although there have been no direct challenges to the District's
authority to establish riparian habitat protection zones for the Econ
River, development interests have unsuccessfully challenged WID
authority to regulate uplands for the benefit of any species, whether
the species is aquatic or wetland dependent.353 In 1995, in Florida
Electric Power Coordinating Group, Inc. v. Suwanee River Water
Management District, petitioners challenged the validity of several
proposed water management district rules, asserting that the rules
were invalid exercises of legislative authority because they regulated
uplands, and thereby exceeded the authority granted by the district's
enabling statute.5 One of the rules in question proposed to protect
existing upland nests and dens of aquatic or wetland dependent
species and adjacent uplands necessary to support the nests and
dens.355 The hearing officer rejected petitioner's challenge, finding
the proposed rule was a valid exercise of authority because basic
scientific principles supported the district's position that aquatic and
wetland dependent species are an integral part of water resources,
and the regulation of uplands to ensure the survival of these species
was reasonably related to the district's statutory authority. 356
The Florida Electric Power Coordinating Group, Inc. decision is
significant because it is the first decision to explicitly state that the
district's general grant of authority to regulate water resources
includes regulation of uplands to benefit aquatic and wetland
dependent species. Recall that in Friends of Fort George, the
district governing board stated that district authority did not extend
to upland species, thereby implying, but not stating affirmatively,
that district authority did include aquatic and wetland dependent
species. Further, Florida Electric Power CoordinatingGroup, Inc.
has greater value as precedent because it was a final order of Florida
Division of Administrative Hearings, an entity independent from the
41.023(4) (defining the Econlockhatchee River Hydrologic Basin);
Id. r. 40C-41.063(5) (establishing standards and criteria for the
Econlockhatchee River Hydrologic Basin, including a 550 foot wide
riparian habitat protection zone).
353. See Fla. Elec. Power Coordinating Group, Inc. v. Suwanee
River Water Mgmt. Dist., Nos. 94-2722RU, 94-2930RP, 942935RP, 94-2936RP (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings July 24, 1995).
354. Suwanee, at 74 (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings July 24, 1995).
355. Id. at 75.
356. Id. at 76.
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district, whereas Friends of Fort George was a final order of the St.
Johns River Water Management District. In 1998, a state appeals
court explicitly affirmed the authority of water management districts
to regulate uplands for the benefit of aquatic and wetland dependent
species in a case challenging proposed St. Johns River Water
Management District riparian habitat protection zones for the
Tomoka River.357
Part IV.D.2.c of this article discusses
administrative and judicial decisions concerning the Tomoka River
zones.
4. Local Government Buffer Zones
Local governments responded quickly to recommendations of the
Econ Task Force, consultants, and the District to protect riparian
habitat, despite the absence of a legislative directive.358 Orange
County adopted an ordinance prohibiting development in the first
550 feet from the river and limiting development between 550 and
1100 feet from the river. 59
Seminole County amended its
comprehensive plan and adopted a river protection ordinance
3 60
establishing protection zones similar to those in Orange County.
Remarkably, local governments adopted ordinances which are even
more protective than those for the Wekiva. Further, the ordinances
are consistent, establishing nearly identical protection zones for the
River. The process the district followed in developing the Econ
program undoubtedly helped facilitate local action to protect the
river.16

357. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Consol.-Tomoka Land
Co., 717 So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), reh'g denied, 727 So.
2d 904 (Fla. 1999).
358. There were no statutory directives requiring local
governments to protect the Econlockhatchee, other than the
conservation requirements of Florida's GMA. See supra notes 14552 and accompanying text.
359. Orange County, Fla., Ordinance No. 91-29 (Dec. 10, 1991).
360. Seminole County, Fla., Ordinance No. 91-9 (June 25, 1991).
361. See supra notes 326-33 and accompanying text.
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c. Tomoka River

A recent administrative decision threatened to sound the death
knell for new water management district riparian habitat protection
zones in Florida. In Consolidated-Tomoka Land Company v. St.
Johns River Water Management District, landowners challenged the
validity of proposed St. Johns River Water Management District
rules creating riparian protection zones adjacent to the Tomoka
River and Spruce Creek, located on the east coast of central
Landowners asserted the zones violated multiple
Florida.362
provisions of Florida's recently amended Administrative Procedure
Act,363 including allegations the rules exceeded the District's
rulemaking authority, enlarged the specific provisions of law being
implemented, were arbitrary and capricious, and were unsupported
by competent substantial evidence.364 The administrative law judge
ruled the riparian habitat protection zones exceeded the District's
statutory authority, based on Florida's new APA.3 65 However, the
substantial evidence
judge found the zones were based on 3competent
66
capricious.
and
and were not arbitrary
362. Consol.-Tomoka Land Co. v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt.
Dist., Nos. 97-0870RP, 97-0871RP, 1997 Fla. ENV LEXIS 97 (Fla.
Div. Adm. Hearings June 27, 1997), 717 So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998), reh'g denied, 727 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1999).
363. In 1996, the Florida Legislature substantially revised Florida's
Administrative Procedure Act. 1996 Fla. Laws. ch. 96-159 (codified
as amended at FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1997)); see supra notes 113-17.
364. Consol.-Tomoka, 1997 Fla. LEXIS 97, at *8-*9. Landowners
also asserted the rules were invalid because the rules failed to
establish adequate guidance and standards, vested unbridled
discretion in the District, and a suitable lower cost alternative
existed. Landowners also requested attorney's fees and costs,
claiming the District's actions were not substantially justified. Id.
365. Id. at *60-*62.
366. Id. at *33, *36. The judge ruled in favor of the District on the
remaining claims, holding that 1) the rules established adequate
guidance and standards, 2) the rules did not vest unbridled discretion
in the district, 3) the rules were not invalid because a lower cost
alternative existed, and 4) the District's rulemaking was justified and
thus landowners were not entitled to attorney's fees and costs. Id. at
*75.
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This decision illustrates the potential negative affect of recent
amendments to Florida's APA. The 1996 amendments to the APA
greatly restrict agency discretion in rulemaking, requiring both a
general grant of rulemaking authority and a specific law that grants
"particular powers and duties. 3 67 In Consolidated-Tomoka, the
judge determined the rule satisfied the general grant of authority,36
but failed to identify specific law granting "particular powers and
duties" because the District's organic statute does not refer to
riparian habitat protection zones or any specific program or duty that
would authorize the zones.3 69 In the judge's words, "even though the
proposed rules are not arbitrary or capricious, are supported by
competent and substantial evidence, and substantially accomplish the
statutory objectives, they are procedurally flawed because they lack
the underlying statutory detail now required under the new law."370
This standard severely limits the ability of agencies to adopt
meaningful new programs to protect biodiversity or other natural
functions without explicit new grants of statutory authority.
The judge also stated the amended APA "reverses years of
precedent" because it shifts the burden of proof from the challenger
to the agency.' Under the old APA, the challenger had the burden
of proving its allegations were correct. The new APA, however,
requires the agency to prove "that the proposed rule is not an invalid
exercise of delegated legislative authority as to the objections
'
raised."372
The new allocation of burden may prove to be
367. Id. at *58. The new APA language places extraordinary
restraints on agency rulemaking in Florida. See supra note 113.
368. Id. at *58.
369. Id. at *18-*19, *58-*62. The judge determined statutory
language directing the District to "require such permits and impose
such reasonable conditions" to assure surface water management
systems are "not harmful to the water resources of the district," and
to adopt rules "necessary to implement the provisions of this part"
which are "consistent with state water policy and shall not allow
harm to water resources

. .

." did not provide sufficient authority for

the zones because they did not refer to a riparian habitat protection
zone or any specific program or duty which would authorize the
zones. Id.
370. Consol.-Tomoka, 1997 Fla. LEXIS 97, at *61.
371. Id. at *49.
372. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ch. 120.56(2)(a) (1996)).
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extraordinarily burdensome and time-consuming for agencies
because it requires them to disprove all allegations, legitimate or not,
37
cited in the original petition. 1
A Florida appeals court recently reversed the administrative
decision, finding it unlikely that the Legislature intended "to
establish a rulemaking standard based on the level of detail in the
enabling statute, because such as standards would be unworkable."374
In interpreting the legislative history of the APA amendments, the
court crafted a "functional test based on the nature of the power or
duty at issue and not the level of detail in the language of the
applicable statute. 3 75 A rule that falls within the "range of powers"
identified in the implementing statute is valid.376 The Florida
supreme court declined to review the decision.37 7
The District's victory was short lived, however. In 1999, the
Florida Legislature amended the APA to directly overturn the
Consolidated-Tomoka functional test.3 7 The APA now requires that
agencies may only adopt rules "that implement or interpret the
379
specific powers and duties granted by the enabling statute.$
373. Id. at *50-*51. For example, in the instant case landowners
filed sixty-seven objections to the proposed rules. The amended
APA allows for attorneys fees and costs under certain circumstances
if the challenger prevails on any issue. Thus, agency attorneys
would be expedient to disprove all allegations, regardless of facial
merit. Id. at *50.
374. Id. at *5.
375. Id. at *6. The court examined legislative intent after first
determining that the phrase "particular powers and duties" was
ambiguous.
376. Consol.-Tomoka, 1997 Fla. LEXIS 97, at *6.
377. Consol.-Tomoka Land Co., v. St. Johns River Mgmt. Dist.,
727 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1999).
378. 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-379 (codified at FLA. STAT. chs.
120.52(8), 120.536(1) (2001)). A committee report accompanying
the legislation explicitly lists Consolidated-Tomoka. FLA. H.R.
COMM. ON WATER RESOURCE & MGMT., BILL RESEARCH AND
ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT (1998).
379. FLA. STAT. chs. 120.52(8), 120.536(1) (2001). The full text
of this provision states:
A grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not
sufficient to allow an agency to adopt a rule; a specific
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Predictably, these legislative changes have spawned a flurry of rule
challenges"' and commentary."' Although the exact meaning of the

law to be implemented is also required. An agency may
adopt only rules that implement or interpret the specific
powers and duties granted by the enabling statute. No
agency shall have authority to adopt a rule only because it
is reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling
legislation and is not arbitrary and capricious or is within
the agency's class of powers and duties, nor shall an
agency have the authority to implement statutory
provisions setting forth general legislative intent or
policy. Statutory language granting rulemaking authority
or generally describing the powers and functions of an
agency shall be construed to extend no further than
implementing or interpreting the specific powers and
duties conferred by the same statute.
Id. (emphasis added). The previous version of these statutory
section required that an agency may adopt "only rules that
implement, interpret, or make specific the particularpowers and
duties granted by the enabling statute. . . ." FLA. STAT. chs.
120.52(8), 120.536(1) (1977) (emphasis added).
380. See, e.g., Southwest Florida Water Management District v.
Save the Manatee Club, Inc., 773 So. 2d 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (holding that rules granting exemptions to environmental
permitting requirements were an invalid exercise of legislative
authority "because they do not implement or interpret a specific
power granted by the applicable enabling statute." Id. at 596)
(emphasis added); State of Fla. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund v. Day Cruise Ass'n, Inc., 794 So. 2d 696
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding invalid a proposed rule that
would forbid mooring or anchoring of certain vessels to sovereignty
submerged lands because the rule exceeded statutory rulemaking
authority and failed to implement specific enabling legislation).
381. See, e.g., Martha C. Mann, Note, St. Johns River Water
Management District v. Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co.: Defining
Agency Rulemaking Authority Under The 1996 Revisions To The
Florida Administrative Procedure Act, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 517
(1999); Jim Rossi, Symposium: Approaching The Millennium: Are
Pennsylvania'sAdministrative Procedure Statutes Still Doing The
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amendments is yet to be resolved, it is clear that agency rules in
Florida now require much more specific grants of enabling authority
than in the past.
The dispute over the proposed Tomoka program and recent
changes to the APA may deter new habitat-based riparian protection
zones in Florida unless the Legislature provides water management
districts with additional statutory authority.38 2 However, the debate
will probably not affect the Wekiva protection program because of
the specific grant of statutory authority to the SJRWMD to establish
protection zones to prevent harm to aquatic and wetland-dependent
The SJRWMD's authority for the
wildlife species.3 83
Econlockhatchee River is more precarious because the program is
based on the District's general authority to regulate "water
resources." The amended APA extends its reach backward in time,
requiring that all agencies provide the Administrative Procedures
Committee with a listing of each rule, or portion of a rule, adopted
prior to the effective date of the APA amendments, which exceeds
the rulemaking authority permitted by the APA."' The Florida
legislature will then decide whether to enact specific legislation
Job?: "Statutory Nondelegation": Learning From Florida'sRecent
Experience In Administrative Procedure Reform, 8 WIDENER J. PUB.
L. 301 (1999); David M. Greenbaum & Lawrence E. Sellers, Jr.,
1999 Amendments To The Florida Administrative Procedure Act:
Phantom Menace Or Much Ado About Nothing?, 27 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 499 (2000).
382. Consol.-Tomoka Land Co. v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt.
Dist., Nos. 97-0870RP, 97-0871RP, 1997 Fla. ENV LEXIS 97 (Fla.
Div. Adm. Hearings June 27, 1997), 717 So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998), reh'g denied, 727 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1999)
383. The protection zones must be wide enough to "prevent harm
to the Wekiva River System, including water quality, water quantity,
hydrology, wetlands, and aquatic and wetland-dependent wildlife
species." FLA. STAT. ch. 373.415(1). The District must also
consider the "biological significance of the wetlands and uplands
adjacent to the designated watercourses . . . including the nesting,
feeding, breeding, and resting needs of aquatic species and wetlanddependent wildlife species." Id. at ch. 373.415(1)(a).
384. Id. at ch. 120.536(2). Agencies must provide the list by
October 1, 1997, one year after the effective date of the amendments.
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authorizing the identified rules, or portions of the rules.385 Each
agency must repeal each rule or portion of a rule for which the
legislature fails to adopt specific authorizing legislation. 86 The
SJRWMD, believing its Econlockhatchee and Tomoka rules to be'
based on sufficient statutory authority, did not identify the rules as
exceeding its rulemaking authority under the new APA.387
A positive aspect of the Consolidated-Tomoka decisions are their
affirmation of the rationale for the riparian habitat protection zones.
During the administrative hearing, both sides presented expert
testimony concerning the logic and reason for the zones. The
administrative judge took an in-depth look at the rationale for the
zones and the standards and criteria in the District's rule, which are
essentially the same as those for the Wekiva and Econlockhatchee
Rivers. The administrative judge determined the District had the
more credible and persuasive evidence, and that the zones were
based on logic and reason. 88 Further, the judge reviewed the
riparian habitat protection standard and the rebuttable presumption
designating certain activities as having adverse effects on the
zones, 389 and determined they provided adequate guidance to
385. Id. The legislature will review the lists at the 1998 Regular
Session. Id.
386. FLA. STAT. ch. 120.536(2). Agencies must initiate repeals by
January 1, 1999. Id. By February 1, 1999, the Administrative
Procedures Committee must notify the legislature of any rules that
an agency had previously identified as exceeding the rulemaking
authority permitted by the APA for which proceedings to repeal the
rule have not been initiated. Id. If the agency fails to act within six
months, the Administrative Procedures Committee or any
substantially affected person may petition an agency to repeal the
rule. Id.
387. Telephone Interview with William H. Congdon, Attorney,
Office of General Counsel, St. Johns River Water Management
District (July 22, 1998).
388. Consol.-Tomoka Land Co., v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt.
Dist., Nos. 97-0870RP, 97-0871RP, 1997 Fla. ENV LEXIS 97, *29*34 (Fla. Div. Adm. Hearings June 27, 1997), 717 So. 2d 72 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998), reh'g denied, 727 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1999).
389. See supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text (describing
the District's nearly identical riparian habitat protection standard and
rebuttable presumption for the Wekiva River).
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regulators and regulated entities.9 The administrative judge's ruling
that the riparian habitat protection zone rules provide adequate
guidance, are supported by competent substantial evidence, and are
not arbitrary and capricious further solidifies the zones as a
legitimate approach to protecting biodiversity in river systems.

V. IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS AND SUGGESTED REFORMS

Ecosystem management is a promising approach to managing
natural resources, yet it is unlikely to conserve biodiversity on
private lands unless lawmakers provide regulators and local
governments with clear directives to conserve biodiversity. Florida's
experience raises a number of issues and suggests several models to
implement ecosystem management, despite the shortcomings
discussed throughout this article.
A. Ecosystem Management as the OverarchingPrinciplefor
Regulatory Programs
The principles of ecosystem management-connectedness,
ecological management, ecological integrity, data collection,
evaluation/auditing, adaptive management, interagency cooperation,
organizational change, humans are critical, and human values 39
"-are
fundamentally sound and address many of the common barriers to
natural resource regulation identified in Part IH. Two of the most
important principles for biodiversity conservation are the recognition
that ecosystems are the appropriate management unit, rather than
arbitrary political boundaries, and that basic ecological functions
390. Consol.-Tomoka, 1997 Fla. ENV LEXIS 97, at *37-*39. For
example, one of petitioner's expert witnesses (accepted as an expert
in environmental permitting) conceded that "he has utilized, without
difficulty or misunderstanding, the same provisions when processing
applications for permits in the Econlockhatchee and Wekiva
Basins." Id. at *40-*42. Further, District records showed only two
denials out of 560 permit applications since adoption of the
Econlockhatchee and Wekiva rules. Id. at *39. This fact may,
however, call into question the rigor with which the District is
implementing its rules for those two systems.
391. Grumbine, supra note 9, at 29-31.
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must be maintained and restored. These principles, if implemented,
could go a long way in conserving biodiversity on private lands.
Despite its potential, it is not clear to what extent ecosystem
management will conserve biodiversity because ecosystem
management involves a balancing of economic, environmental, and
social values.
Biodiversity conservation is clearly a goal of
ecosystem management, but it is only one of ten goals. Ecosystem
management also requires active involvement and cooperation by all
government entities because each operates within certain geographic
and substantive constraints.
Florida's ecosystem management policy illustrates why effective
ecosystem management must be comprehensive and contain clear
and substantial substantive legal authority. For example, it does
little good for the Legislature to direct Florida's Department of
Environmental Protection, with limited authority over land use, to
promote ecosystem management without also requiring the
Department of Community Affairs and local governments to practice
ecosystem management and conserve biodiversity. Legislators must
recognize that biodiversity conservation cannot be accomplished
solely on public lands, and that ecosystem management on private
lands will require more than improved efficiency of existing
programs and voluntary cooperation by land owners.392 The Florida
Legislature should amend Chapter 163, part U, Florida Statutes, to
require local governments to adopt comprehensive plan provisions
and land development regulations to implement' ecosystem
management and to conserve biodiversity, including non-listed
aquatic, wetland-dependent, and upland species of wildlife.
The proposed regional commission and management plan for the
Green Swamp would facilitate consistent ecosystem management.393
The Florida Legislature should amend Chapter 380, Florida Statutes,
to encourage local governments to adopt the proposed Green Swamp
94
model, in exchange for de-designation as an ACSC.

392. See supra note 188-90 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 326-33 and accompanying text.
394. See FLA. STAT. ch. 380.05(12) (1997) (providing for dedesignation if local governments successfully protect the area for at
least one year).
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B. Substantive Standardsfor Biodiversity Conservation

Ecosystem management involves a balancing of social, economic,
and environmental factors. Ecosystem management programs that
fail to include legislative directives to conserve biodiversity are
unlikely to protect biodiversity on private lands because economics
and social factors will inevitably win the day.
Ecosystem management principles are not drastically different
from Multiple-Use-Sustained-Yield ("MUSY") principles, yet past
experiences with MUSY illustrate how easily public land managers
can promote certain management objectives, such as timber
production, to the consistent exclusion of other important objectives,
such as watershed and wildlife.395 Ecosystem management presents

regulators with the same fundamental dilemmas. For example,
ecosystem management promotes maintaining ecosystem functions,
while at the same time promoting human economic and social
values. If regulators are given sufficient discretion to balance
ecosystem management principles, to the possible exclusion of
ecosystem function, the policy is likely to fail to conserve
biodiversity.
Obviously, not all private lands can be managed to conserve
biodiversity. The danger, however, is that regulators will merely
give lip service to biodiversity, and will continue business as usual.
Laws authorizing ecosystem management must establish clear
substantive criteria to deal with the inevitable conflicts that will arise
between ecosystem, economic, and social values. Otherwise, the
policy will be subject to the same subjective interpretations as
MUSY, and will likely fail to conserve ecosystems and biodiversity.
The Wekiva, Econ, and Tomoka programs, involving riparian
buffers that prohibit almost all development, illustrate the type of
dramatic restraints on private land use that are necessary to conserve
biodiversity.396
The Florida Legislature should build on the success of the Wekiva
and Econ programs and amend Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, to
395. See generally Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and
the Public Lands: Why "Multiple Use" Failed, 18 HARV. ENvTL. L.
REv. 405 (discussing the failure of multiple use policy).
396. See supra Part IV.D.2.
Even these programs provide
marginal biodiversity conservation, purporting to conserve only 50%
of the species inhabiting the systems.
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provide clear and unambiguous authority for the water management
districts to consider and regulate for the benefit of biodiversity,
including aquatic, wetland-dependent, and upland species of
wildlife. The Legislature should also amend Chapter 373 to
establish minimum state criteria directing water management
districts to identify candidate river systems for special protection. In
addition, the Legislature should create a process for development of
river-specific protection programs, perhaps similar to that followed
for the Wekiva and Econlockhatchee Rivers.
Legislatures must establish clear goals for conserving biodiversity,
and then provide regulators with the authority to obtain those goals.
Florida's Wekiva program is a good example of a program where the
legislature provided clear and unambiguous criteria requiring
conservation of biodiversity. 39 7 The legislation requires the water
management district to adopt riparian protection zones wide enough
to protect wildlife, including consideration of nesting, feeding,
breeding, and resting needs of aquatic and wetland-dependent
species.398 In contrast, Florida's statewide ecosystem management
policy lacks meaningful criteria to conserve biodiversity, merely
directing DEP to protect ecological systems through "enhanced
coordination of public acquisition, regulatory, and planning
'
programs."399
Legislators and regulators should develop substantive standards for
categories of natural systems, or on a system-by-system basis.
Several general issues they should address include requirements for
1) resource inventories, 2) minimum state standards to protect
biodiversity, ecosystem function, and ecosystem integrity, 3) buffer
zones to protect water, wetlands, wildlife, and scenic values, 4) core
preservation areas to protect non-linear natural systems 5)
cumulative impacts assessment programs, and 6) wildlife corridors.

397. See FLA. STAT. ch. 373.415(1).
398. Id.
399. 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-213 § 2(2)(c) (codified at FLA. STAT.
ch. 20.255 (1997)); see also supra notes 179-97 and accompanying
text (discussing shortcomings of Florida's ecosystem management
policy).
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C. InstitutionalApproaches

This Part summarizes in general terms several different
institutional approaches to regulating natural systems, drawing
heavily upon Florida's regulatory experience.
1. Comprehensive Statewide Ecosystem Management Model
To be effective, ecosystem management must be integrated into all
environmental and land use regulatory programs, at all levels of
government. Florida's approach, though noteworthy as the nation's
first state ecosystem management policy, is insufficient because it
does not provide adequate substantive authority nor involve all
appropriate agencies.4"' A better approach would involve a new
statute creating a comprehensive statewide ecosystem management
program, designating a lead agency as in Florida, but also requiring
other relevant agencies to implement the policy.
The statute should contain meaningful substantive criteria, as
discussed in the preceding Part. A statute that merely directs
agencies to implement ecosystem management is likely to fail.
Instead, the statute should identify important types of ecosystems,
establish minimum criteria to protect those ecosystems, and direct
agencies to adopt specific ecosystem management programs for
those ecosystems. For example, the Florida Legislature should
establish criteria to protect specific river systems, including riparian
wildlife and habitat, and direct the water managements to develop
river specific ecosystem management programs.
2. Comprehensive Growth Management Model
A comprehensive growth management statute, like the Florida
GMA, provides an excellent institutional mechanism to implement
statewide ecosystem management. In fact, the Florida program
addresses many of the components of ecosystem management,
including conservation of forests and other vegetative communities,
wildlife, wildlife habitat, and other environmentally sensitive
lands.40 ' The Florida approach places responsibility on local
governments to develop comprehensive plans, subject to approval by
400. See supra Part IV.B.
401. FLA. STAT. ch. 163.3177(6)(d).
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the state.402 Local plans must be consistent with regional and state
minimum standards, and must be coordinated with the plans of
adjacent local governments.4"3 These requirements may facilitate the
large-scale landscape approach needed for ecosystem management.
In jurisdictions where the institutional structures for state
comprehensive planning already exist, it would be fairly easy to add
ecosystem management requirements to these programs. Recent
amendments to Florida's Administrative Procedure Act have cast
some doubt on whether Florida's Department of Community Affairs
has sufficient statutory authority to implement ecosystem
management objectives through agency rulemaking.4 4 The Florida
Legislature should remove any uncertainties and amend Chapter
163, part II, Florida Statutes, to require local governments to adopt
comprehensive plan provisions and land development regulations to
implement ecosystem management and to conserve biodiversity,
including non-listed aquatic, wetland-dependent, and upland species
of wildlife.
3. Ecosystem Specific Models
a. ACSC Model (State Mandate/LocalImplementation)
The Area of Critical State Concern ("ACSC") model creates a
mechanism to designate and protect areas of critical importance to
the state.40 5 Once the legislature has designated an ACSC, the state
planning agency is authorized to adopt rules to guide local
government review of development proposals within an ACSC and
to appeal local decisions that are inconsistent with state standards.4 6
Local governments are required to comply with the state rules and
statutes

designating

the

ACSC.

°7

Local governments

that

402. See supra notes 132-79.
403. Id.
404. See, e.g., Consol.-Tomoka Land Co., v. St. Johns River Water
Mgmt. Dist., Nos. 97-0870RP, 97-0871RP, 1997 Fla. ENV LEXIS
97 (Fla. Div. Adm. Hearings June 27, 1997), 717 So. 2d 72 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998), reh'g denied, 727 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1999).
405. See supra notes 230-66 and accompanying text (discussing
Florida's ACSC program).
406. FLA. STAT. ch. 380.05(1)(a).
407. See supra notes 233-47 and accompanying text.
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successfully protect an ACSC may obtain de-designation, otherwise
the designation remains in place. Either way, the resource values
should be protected because the state retains authority to
immediately re-designate former ACSCs if local governments are
not protecting the area.4"'
Florida's experience suggests the ACSC approach of state
mandates may engender resentment and resistance at the local level
that ultimately impedes the program's effectiveness, however.4 9
Other problems include inadequate governmental coordination and
failure to update the agency rules for specific ACSCs to reflect new
priorities, technology, and scientific understanding. ' In addition,
the program may be under-used because each new designation
requires new legislation.
The ACSC approach has potential to avoid some barriers to
ecosystem management and to promote biodiversity conservation,
despite the program's marginal success in Florida. Ideally, ACSCs
should be delineated on natural system boundaries, rather than
political boundaries."'
ACSCs are well suited to promoting
intergovernmental coordination because the state establishes
minimum criteria that all local governments must implement. The
approach also provides ample opportunity for the state to establish
meaningful substantive criteria, because each ACSC designation
requires specific legislative action.
b. ProposedGreen Swamp Model (State Mandate/Regional
Commission and Plan/Regionaland Local Implementation)
The approach proposed by the Green Swamp Task Force involved
a legislative mandate establishing protection criteria and creating a
regional commission with jurisdiction over an entire natural
system.4" The regional commission, comprised of representatives
from local, regional, and state government, must develop a

408. FLA. STAT. ch. 380.05(1)(d).
409. See supra note 254.
410. See supra note 253.
411. Florida's Green Swamp ACSC includes about 58 percent of
the natural system. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 232-68 and accompanying text (discussing
the proposed Green Swamp programs).
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comprehensive management plan for the entire system." 3 Local
governments must implement the comprehensive management plan
through their comprehensive plans and land development
regulations.4"4 The regional commission has authority to review and
override local decisions that are inconsistent with the comprehensive
management plan.
The proposed Green Swamp approach has great potential because
it addresses many of the barriers to ecosystem management. Perhaps
most notably, the program creates a regional commission and a
comprehensive regional plan, thus addressing problems of
intergovernmental coordination. However, it involves creating a
new government entity that diminishes local authority, and thus may
encounter substantial resistance.
c. Wekiva Model (State Mandate/Regionaland Local
Implementation)
The Wekiva model is based upon a legislative directive requiring a
regional agency and local governments to protect a river system.4"
One of the strengths of the Wekiva model is the statute itself, which
contains clear substantive guidance for the water management
district and local governments to establish protection zones to
protect aquatic and wetland-dependent wildlife." 6
The Wekiva approach works only if a suitable regional agency
exists. Florida's water management districts are well suited to
managing watersheds, although limited statutory authority precludes
them from actively regulating much of the upland habitat within
watersheds." 7 If an appropriate regional agency does not already
exist, the proposed Green Swamp Model may be a better approach.

413. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
414. Id.
415. See supra notes 267-323 and accompanying text (discussing
the Wekiva River program).
416. FLA. STAT. ch. 373.415(1) (1997).
417. See supra notes 325-28 and accompanying text.
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d. EconlockhatcheeModel
(No State Mandate/Regionaland Local Implementation)

The Econlockhatchee Model involves riparian habitat protection
zones adopted through rulemaking by a regional agency,
accompanied by complementary action by local governments." 8
Remarkably, the Econlockhatchee program contains similar
substantive standards to the Wekiva, despite having no common
statutory directive.4" 9
The St. Johns River Water Management District's experience with
the Tomoka River highlights a key potential problem agencies in
Florida presently face. Agencies are vulnerable to challenges
whenever there is no specific statutory authorization for rulemaking
because of Florida's overly restrictive Administrative Procedure
Act.42° The Legislature should amend the APA to provide agencies
with more discretion, or amend substantive laws to provide specific
detailed standards requiring regulators to implement ecosystem
management, maintain ecosystem function and integrity, and
conserve biodiversity. An additional weakness of this approach is
that there are no guarantees that local governments will cooperate.
CONCLUSION

Ecosystem management is a promising tool with potential to
conserve biodiversity on private lands. Whether this effort will
conserve biodiversity depends in large part on the willingness of
legislatures to adopt innovative regulatory approaches containing
clear substantive standards to conserve ecosystem functions and
integrity. Many existing regulatory programs are simply inadequate
because they regulate one or two natural functions, without regard to
the full array of ecosystem components or the ecosystem as a whole.
As a result, many important ecosystem components are not
regulated. This myopic approach ignores ecosystem relationships
418. See supra notes 328-63 and accompanying text (discussing
the Econlockhatchee River program).
419. See id.
420. See, e.g., Consol.-Tomoka Land Co., v. St. Johns River Water
Mgmt. Dist., Nos. 97-0870RP, 97-0871RP, 1997 Fla. ENV LEXIS
97 (Fla. Div. Adm. Hearings June 27, 1997), 717 So. 2d 72 (Fla:
Dist. Ct. App. 1998), reh'g denied, 727 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1999).
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and dynamics. Further, many programs are severely constrained by
narrow statutory authority, 42 ' and will be unable to establish the
institutional framework and substantive standards required for
ecosystem management and biodiversity conservation without
additional grants of authority.
Existing state and regional regulatory programs can serve as
models for development of ecosystem management programs
appropriate for management of private lands. Comprehensive state
regulatory programs, such as Florida's Growth Management Act,
provide the kind of institutional structure necessary to begin
implementing ecosystem management on a large scale.422 Many of
these programs, however, require additional substantive standards
relating to ecosystem management and biodiversity conservation,
such as standards addressing wildlife corridors and habitat,
biodiversity, genetic variability, plant communities, and riparian
corridors. 23 Further scientific research is needed to form'the basis
for such standards.
Regional plans developed to manage entire ecosystems, such as
programs for the Wekiva River and the proposed Green Swamp
program, are also well suited to implementing ecosystem
management and conserving biodiversity. 41 Programs which create
a regional entity with oversight authority are more likely to achieve
compliance than voluntary programs. Local government and citizen
resistance to regional programs may be minimized if local citizens
and officials are allowed to actively participate in plan development
and implementation.
Effective ecosystem management to conserve biodiversity will
require substantial restrictions on the use of private property, as
illustrated by the Wekiva and Econ programs. Constitutional
constraints and societal views regarding private property rights and
government regulation could substantially impede ecosystem
management and biodiversity conservation efforts on private
lands.2 5
Narrow statutory authority and restrictive state
administrative procedure statutes, like Florida's, further constrain

421.
422.
423.
424.
425.

See supra note 211.
See supra notes 133-44 and accompanying text.
See supra Part V.B.
See supra Parts IV.D.1, IV.D.1.2.a.
See supra Part III.E.
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agency rulemaking.426 Florida's legislators could reduce some of
these barriers by amending key laws to require agencies and local
governments to implement ecosystem management, maintain
ecosystem function and integrity, and conserve biodiversity.
Ecosystem management on private lands will require a creative
blend of new regulatory approaches, incentives, and citizen
cooperation. The Florida Legislature's directive to DEP to protect
ecosystems through "enhanced coordination of public acquisition,
regulatory, and planning programs, 427 is tacit recognition of the
legal and political difficulties of regulatory programs to protect
biodiversity. Yet, it is highly unlikely that ecosystem management
and biodiversity conservation can be achieved primarily through
"enhanced coordination" of existing regulatory programs and other
voluntary programs. 2
Florida's Legislature, as well as other
legislatures, should also provide meaningful statutory authority to
agencies charged with implementing ecosystem management and
conserving biodiversity.

426. Id.
427. FLA. STAT. ch. 20.255 (1997).
428. With few exceptions, voluntary programs often result in
failure. For example, Florida's precursor to the current Growth
Management Act, the Local Government Comprehensive Planning
Act of 1975, was largely ignored by local governments because it
did not have the force of law. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-257. The
Florida Quality Developments Program, which provides a
streamlined permitting process in exchange for conformance with
certain environmental protection criteria, has been infrequently used
by developers. FLA. STAT. ch. 380.061 (1993). At the national
level, the Water Resources Planning Act, which was intended to
facilitate interstate river basin management, has been strongly
criticized as being ineffective because of its non-binding nature. The
Act was eventually repealed. U.S. Water Resources Planning Act,
Pub. L. No. 89-80, 79 Stat., repealed by Exec. Order No. 12,319, 46
Fed. Reg. 45,591 (Sept. 30, 1981); see also JEFFRY S. WADE ET AL.,
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR BASINWIDE MANAGEMENT OF THE
ACF BASIN: THE FLORIDA PERSPECTIVE 46, 47 (Feb. 9, 1994).

Voluntary efforts to protect the New Jersey Pinelands were also
unsuccessful, in sharp contrast to the substantial protection achieved
by a subsequent mandatory planning and regulatory program.

